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NOTE

The Death of Copyright Protection in
Individual Price Valuations, a Flawed Merger
Doctrine, and Financial Market Manipulation:
New York Mercantile Exchange v.
IntercontinentalExchange
JEREMY V. MURRAY'

INTRODUCTION

William Blake once observed, "The difference between a
bad artist and a good one is: The bad artist seems to copy a
great deal; the good one really does copy a great deal."1
Such rings true for the insurmountably successful
IntercontinentalExchange (ICE).2 ICE provided steep

t J.D. Candidate, 2009, State University of New York at Buffalo Law School;
M.Phil., 2006, University of Dublin, Trinity College; B.A., 2005, State
University of New York at Geneseo. I would like to thank Professor Jeffrey
Malkan for introducing me to the premise for this Note and for his guidance. In
addition, I would like to thank Professor Amy Westbrook, Lindsay Swensen,
and Dan Sheehan for their insight on current financial and regulatory matters.
Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends for their support.
1. EDWIN JOHN ELLIS, THE REAL BLAKE: A PORTRAIT BIOGRAPHY 379 (1906).

2. Murray Coleman, Electronic TradingFirms Set for Strong Earnings:ICE,
ITG Expected to Report Double-Digit Growth, Capitalize on Tech Expansion,
MARKETWATCH, Apr. 26, 2007, at 1, http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/
electronic-trading-firms-set-report/story.aspx?guid={41F64161-4BF6-48D8
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competition to rival energy commodity trader, New York
Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) by using particular
NYMEX settlement prices for its own futures contracts and
hybrid commodity instruments. 3 Despite such allocation,
making use of another exchange's price data is certainly not
unusual amongst the financial markets. In fact, the sale of
such price information to market data vendors accounts for
a significant amount of revenue for many exchanges. 4
Furthermore, settlement prices for the various exchanges
may only be kept private for a limited period of time. After
all, pursuant to the Commodity Futures Modernization Act
(CFMA), the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC) actually requires that such prices be publicly
disclosed before the next business day.5
However, as an exchange that, until recently, had
substantially less regulatory authority than that of
NYMEX, ICE provides a more appealing market for
clientele who prefer to have their activity escape CFTC
oversight.6 Moreover, traders potentially view ICE and
NYMEX as "essentially one market for Henry Hub natural
gas futures"-to the point where it is nearly "impossible to

9BA8-642F5FFE95CA} ("IntercontinentalExchange, Inc. (ICE) ...last year was
the New York Stock Exchange's big winner with total returns of 196.8%. This
year, its stock continues to rise, though at a more sober 20% clip.").
3. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. IntercontinentalExch., Inc., 497 F.3d 109,
112 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1669 (2008); see also Lynn Garner,
Senate Democrats Offer Bills to Boost CFTC Oversight of Commodity Trading,
40 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), at 946 (June 16, 2008) (explaining that ICE has
"grown into a direct competitor to NYMEX").
4. See INDEXING FOR MAXIMUM INVESTMENT RESULTS 354 (Albert S. Neubert

et al. eds., 1998) (explaining that "licensing fees for real-time financial
information are the second largest source of revenue for financial exchanges
like the CME").
5. See N.Y Mercantile Exch., Inc., 497 F.3d at 112 ("[NYMEX] publicly
discloses those prices by the next business day, as required by the CFTC.");
ROBERT W. KOLB & JAMES A. OVERDAHL, UNDERSTANDING FUTURES MARKETS 531
(6th ed. 2005) (explaining that, under the CFMA, futures exchanges must
"[p]ublish daily trading information on settlement prices, volume, open interest,
and opening and closing ranges for actively traded contracts on the contract
market").
6. See Garner, supra note 3, at 946 (explaining that "futures trading that is
conducted on the InterContinental Exchange . . . escapes CFTC oversight");

NMX: NYMEX HOLDINGS, INC. 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 28 (2007), available at
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/NYMOxx85807/4BFFC03A-27B8-4E64925C-317032133304/49582_NymexFinalPDF.pdf [hereinafter HOLDINGS].
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split the two."' 7 Specifically, ICE's use of NYMEX's
settlement prices for its Henry Hub natural gas and West
Texas intermediate crude oil future contracts has been
harming NYMEX financially since ICE's formation in 2001,
and, in addition, has progressively decreased the amount of
revenue NYMEX receives from the clearing of such
contracts.8
Not surprisingly, NYMEX brought suit against ICE for
copyright infringement, service mark infringement,
trademark dilution, and tortious interference with
contract. 9 ICE counterclaimed that NYMEX violated
Section 2 of the Sherman Act by maintaining a monopoly on
its instruments.' 0 Both parties made motions for summary
judgment in the Southern District of New York on the issue
of NYMEX's copyright and trademark claims-upon which
ICE was successful.11 Without any protection for its two
most profitable futures contracts, a frustrated NYMEX
appealed solely on the issue of copyright protection for its

7.

U.S.

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM'N, PUBLIC HEARING ON EXEMPT

COMMERCIAL MARKETS 41-42, (2007) [hereinafter HEARING], available at
http://www.cftc.gov/stellent/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/eventO918
07_transcript.pdf.
8. For example, the total revenue NYMEX received from clearing and
transaction fees for crude oil futures decreased from 35.4% in 2004 to 26.2% in
2006. See HOLDINGS, supra note 6, at 17. Likewise, the clearing and transaction
revenue for Henry Hub natural gas futures decreased from 17.1% in 2004 to
14.0% in 2006. Id. at 17. The West Texas Intermediate crude oil futures
contract, traded on NYMEX, determines the delivery for West Texas crude in
Cushing, Oklahoma. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. IntercontinentalExchange,
389 F. Supp. 2d 527, 530 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff'd, 497 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2007).
Cushing is home to the primary trading hub for crude oil. In re Crude Oil
Commodity Litigation, No. 06 Civ. 6677, 2007 WL 1946553, 1 (S.D.N.Y. June
28, 2007). This contract is significant in that West Texas Intermediate serves as
the benchmark grade for crude oil in the United States. Jerry W. Markham, 13
Commodities Reg. (West) § 16:10 (2008).
9. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. IntercontinentalExch., Inc., 323 F. Supp. 2d
559, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), affd, 497 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2007).
10. ICE claimed that NYMEX was partaking in unfair monopoly practices
by refusing to allow the exchange to use NYMEX's settlement prices in Henry
Hub natural gas and West Texas Intermediate-that such prices are an
essential facility, that ICE has a right to use such prices, and that NYMEX has
an unlawful competitive advantage in the market by maintaining such a
monopoly. Id. at 560.
11. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. IntercontinentalExch., Inc., 389 F. Supp.
2d 527, 529-30 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), affd, 497 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2007).
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settlement prices, which the Second Circuit examined in
New York Mercantile Exchange, Inc. v. IntercontinentalExchange, Inc. (NYME). 12 The decision that ensued had
such a significant impact on the copyright protection in
individual price values, and on U.S. consumers in light of
limiting property rights in financial data, that any harm
NYMEX may have suffered seemed almost insignificant.
This Note examines the consequences of this decision in
detail.
Part I of this Note will briefly examine the trading
instruments used by both ICE and NYMEX and how
settlement prices for future contracts are determined. In
Part II, the Second Circuit's decision will be reviewed in
detail. Part III will address the harm caused by the Second
Circuit's decision to contradict prior precedent by
heightening the originality requirement for copyright
protection and determining that individual price valuations
can no longer be protected by copyright. Part IV will explain
how the Second Circuit has generated a grossly abusive
form of the merger doctrine which departs from the analysis
set out in Kregos v. Associated Press.13 Part V will examine
how both exchanges are regulated, the economic harms that
arise in failing to protect against encroachment upon price
discovery, and how copyright in settlement prices can put
an end to the recent manipulation that has ravaged
inconsistently regulated markets. Finally, Part VI will
consider how NYMEX would have faired in bringing an
unfair competition claim against ICE in the form of
misappropriation.
I.

THE FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS OF NYMEX AND ICE

A. Future Contracts Versus Over-the-Counter Contracts
In order to fully comprehend the significance of the
Second Circuit's decision, one must first understand how
NYMEX and ICE operate as financial exchanges. NYMEX
is a commodity exchange which provides for the trading of
12. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. IntercontinentalExch., Inc., 497 F.3d 109,
110 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1669 (2008).
13. See infra Part IV for a discussion on Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d
700, 705 (2d Cir. 1991).
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futures and options contracts for energy commodities. 14
Theoretically, futures contracts are based on the "delivery
of a commodity at a specified price at a specified future
time." 15 However, liquidation of the contract well before the
date of delivery typically precludes any actual delivery of
the commodity. 16 For NYMEX, the execution of futures
contracts takes place on the floor of the exchange through
the "matching of buyers and sellers wishing to transact in
the same quantities and at the same prices."' 7 The
transaction is then filed through NYMEX's clearing house,
which assumes the "credit risk" for the performance of each
party to the transaction. 1
Conversely, ICE is an "online Internet-based platform,"
which trades over-the-counter derivative contracts (OTCs)
and futures.' 9 Rather than operating on a trading floor, the
execution of OTCs takes place through an internet-based
locale-a process generally referred to as an "OTC swap."
An OTC swap is an agreement in which a "floating price is
exchanged for a fixed price over a specified period. '20 To
simplify matters, OTCs are usually the same as NYMEX's
future contracts. 21 In fact, ICE's OTC contracts are typically
referred to as "NYMEX look-alikes" by those in the
industry. 22 Likewise, ICE directly uses NYMEX's Henry
Hub and West Texas settlement prices for its own OTCs
and futures contracts-therefore enabling ICE to trade
contracts that are very similar to those traded on NYMEX.
The only difference is that such swaps are hybrid forms of
the option contracts which enable parties to "directly

14. 497 F.3d at 110.
15. Id. (Although, most futures contracts are 'liquidated before physical
delivery occurs.").
16. Id.
17. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. IntercontinentalExch., Inc., 323 F. Supp.
2d 559, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), affid, 497 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2007).
18. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc., 497 F.3d at 111 n.1.
19. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. IntercontinentalExch., Inc., 389 F. Supp.
2d 527, 532-33 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), affd, 497 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2007).
20. Id. at 533.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 534.
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negotiate the terms of their contracts. '23 Finally, ICE clears
these transactions through a clearing house
located abroad
referred to as the London Clearing House. 24
B. NYMEX's Settlement Prices
NYMEX is solely responsible for developing the
settlement prices for Henry Hub and West Texas contracts.
At the close of each trading day, NYMEX evaluates the
price of each open contract-that is, each contract which
has not yet been delivered or liquidated. 25 The value for
every open contract changes based on what the market
believes will be the delivery price of the commodity on a
future date. On account of the changing value of the
delivery price of the open contract, each party either "pays
or receives additional variation margin" on his or her
investment. 26 These changes in value are dictated by
NYMEX's settlement prices, which NYMEX defines as "the
value, at the end of trading each day, of a particular futures
contract for a particular commodity for future delivery at a
particular time. '27 Therefore, the price is speculatively
based on what the price will be at some point in the future.
NYMEX's settlement prices are at the heart of the
controversy in this case. Each settlement price is
determined by the NYMEX Settlement Price Committee.
The Committee meets after the trading for each day is
completed. 28 Although NYMEX is required to disclose the
settlement prices to the public before the next business

23. HOLDINGS, supra note 6, at 9.

24. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. IntercontinentalExch., Inc., 497 F.3d 109,
112 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1669 (2008).
25. Id. at 110.
26. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. IntercontinentalExch., Inc., 323 F. Supp.
2d 559, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff'd, 497 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2007).
27. N.Y Mercantile Exch., Inc., 497 F.3d at 111 ("For example, today's
settlement price for an October 2007 crude oil contract is the fair market value,
today, of a contract obliging the purchase or sale of a specified amount of crude
oil in October 2007.").
28. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. IntercontinentalExch., Inc., 389 F. Supp.
2d 527, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff'd, 497 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2007).
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day, 29 the exchange enables certain data vendors to receive
this information on a real-time basis-"which is generally
within thirty minutes of the data's release by NYMEX."30
Such time sensitive, real-time information is licensed to
market data vendors for a fee, who then provide such
information to subscribers. 3 ' Furthermore, the subscribers
who receive these quotes on a real-time basis must agree
not to compete with NYMEX, while those who receive it on
a delayed basis-beyond the thirty minute period-do not
have to abide by any such agreement. 32 Despite this
disclaimer (and although ICE claims that it receives such
information from a data vendor called GlobalView on a
delayed basis), NYMEX pointed out that ICE also receives
this information from another vendor on a real-time
basis 33-regardless of the fact that ICE has been perceived
as a direct competitor with NYMEX since 2001. 34 ICE then
directly copies the settlement prices for NYMEX's Henry
Hub natural gas and West Texas Intermediate crude oil

29. Id. at 532 ("NYMEX also distributes settlement prices through its
website and to certain national newspapers such as the New York Times and
the Wall Street Journal for publication in the ensuing day's edition of these
newspapers, although not all settlement prices are actually published.").
30. N.Y Mercantile Exch., Inc., 323 F. Supp. 2d at 563.
31. The selling of such "price and quote information [to market vendors] is a
significant source of revenue for many exchanges, with the average proportion
of total income arising from information sales at the surveyed exchanges being
21%." RUBEN LEE, WHAT IS AN EXCHANGE? 103 (1998). For NYMEX, such sales
make up an even more substantial amount of their income; for example, sales of
their exchange information accounted for 29% of NYMEX's total income in
1996. Id. at 104.
32. 323 F. Supp. 2d at 563. At the time of this dispute, ICE was provided
with the prices from a licensed vendor named GlobalView. N.Y Mercantile
Exch., Inc., 389 F. Supp. 2d at 529.
33. 389 F. Supp. 2d at 535-36 (explaining that "ICE received NYMEX prices
from another vendor on a real-time basis").
34. 323 F. Supp. 2d at 566; see also, Vikas Bajaj, The Future of Futures?:
IntercontinentalExchange Brings Technology, and a Debate, to Energy Trading,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2006, at C5 (discussing how IntercontinentalExchange
trades grew five times its size from 2003 to 2006 and now trades "about the
same number of contracts as Nymex," therefore causing both companies to
begin "competing very effectively for market share"); Heather Timmons, India's
Solution for Oil Prices:Ban Speculation by Banning Trading, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
8, 2007, at C6 (explaining how raising oil prices may cause the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission to give "more oversight over Nymex's rival, the
Intercontinental Exchange [sic]").
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futures and uses them for its own financial instruments. 35
Such prices are the exact financial equivalents to those
traded on the exchange.
II. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN NEW YORK
MERCANTILE EXCHANGE, INC. V.
INTERCONTINENTALEXCHANGE INC.

The harm suffered by NYMEX, as well as the
manipulation induced by a market that is regulated under
inconsistent measures, was overlooked by the court, as it
more closely assessed the scope of copyright in individual
price valuation. While it is certain that the court disallowed
copyright protection to NYMEX's settlement prices, little
else in the majority opinion is as clear cut. The majority
misinterpreted precedent concerning price valuation
protection, broadly applied a merger doctrine, and
overlooked the fundamentals of copyright law in failing to
address aspects of creativity in an originality analysisthus, providing a confused standard for copyright in the
future.
A. Summary of the Majority Opinion
The court approached the issue of whether NYMEX
could receive copyright protection in its settlement prices by
considering two important questions. The first was whether
settlement prices were figures that merely existed within
the marketplace and, subsequently, discovered by NYMEX.
The second question-upon which the court's determination
not to provide copyright protection ultimately relied-was
whether the settlement prices could only have been
35. See NY Mercantile Exch., Inc., 323 F. Supp. 2d at 560. The court notes
that "[o]ne small exception" to this direct copying occurs
when there has been trading on an ICE contract and it is not the final
day of trading for that particular contract. In that case, the ICE
committee adjusts the NYMEX settlement price one 'tick' (one cent for
crude oil and one tenth of a cent for natural gas) closer to the weighted
average price of the ICE trades.
N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. IntercontinentalExch., Inc., 497 F.3d 109, 112 (2d

Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1669 (2008). Nevertheless, this exception
rarely occurs and ICE misled its clearing house-the London Clearing Houseby informing them that it would determine its settlement prices
consulting "many sources of price information." 389 F. Supp. 2d at 535.

after
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expressed in such a limited number of ways so that
copyright protection could not be granted-thus, revealing
that the merger doctrine must be applied.
At the outset, Judges Katzmann and Wesley candidly
admitted that they were unable to conclude, as a matter of
law, whether NYMEX created its settlement prices.3 6 Yet,
for sidestepping any definitive conclusion on this matter,
the court certainly devoted a considerable amount of space
to analyzing how NYMEX's Settlement Price Committee
determined the prices for its commodities. The court began
by explaining that the settlement prices are not a reflection
of the final trade for a commodity on a given day-thus,
differentiating from a securities exchange--for two reasons:
[f]irst, because of the nature of the trading, it is not always clear
which trade was the closing trade. Traders handwrite their
transactions on cards which are thrown into the center of trading
rings, scooped up, time stamped, and sent for processing. Because
the cards may be "scooped up" out of order, the card with the latest
time stamp may not represent the final trade of the day. Second,
on any given day, 32 or 33 months of crude oil futures contracts
and 72 months of natural gas futures contracts are being traded.
For the "outer" months, those further from the trading date, there
37
is often little or no trading on a particular day.

The amount of trading for each contract increases as
the expiration date for each contract draws closer. For
instance, those contracts which expire in a two month
period exhibit a greater amount of trading activity than
those which are set to expire in a seventy-two month period.
As for the settlement prices during the "high-volume"
months-those months which involve a great deal of
trading activity-the court believed that the Committee
applies more of a formulaic process based on "a weighted
average of all trades done within the closing range. ' 38 Yet,
since the high volume periods only make up a "small
number" of the total amount of settlement prices, the
court's discussion turned more toward the "low-volume"

36. See NY Mercantile Exch., Inc., 497 F.3d at 110 ("We hold that even if
these prices are created by NYMEX-a question we do not resolve ....
37. Id. at 111.
38. Id.
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used in
months, in which the amount of creativity
39
determining settlement prices is in dispute.
Both ICE and NYMEX dispute how much "creative
judgment" is involved for those low-volume months-those
contracts for which the majority of settlement prices are
determined. 40 For such low-volume months, NYMEX
asserted that the Committee "considers, sifts, weighs and
extrapolates from a wealth of data" in determining the
settlement prices since there is little trading activity
involved for these periods. 41 In addition, NYMEX has the
ability to "override" settlement prices for any given
month-regardless of the volume-for any reason which it
may deem fit for the market. 42 While this last factor enables
the NYMEX Settlement Price Committee to generate any
reasonable price for its contracts, how43often NYMEX resorts
to this practice is similarly contested.
Contrary to NYMEX's claims, ICE countered that the
Committee uses "little judgment" in determining its
settlement prices. 44 Rather, ICE protested that NYMEX
considers objective data, in correlation with the values for
the already existing settlement prices, for the near month
contracts. 45 It is only after this point, ICE claimed, that
order to
NYMEX proceeds to "extrapolate" such data in
46
prices.
settlement
the
of
remainder
the
calculate
The majority then turned to NYMEX's attempt to
receive copyright protection in its settlement prices from
the U.S. Copyright Office. Initially, in April 2002, the
Copyright Office did not provide NYMEX with an 'explicit
claim' of copyright" for its settlement prices alone, but did
receive copyright for its database. 47 Strangely, the detailed
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 111-12.
44. Id. at 111. The amount of creativity used by the Committee in
determining these settlement prices on varying months is in dispute.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. IntercontinentalExch., Inc., 389 F. Supp.
2d 527, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), affd, 497 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
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facts surrounding the application were included in the
district court opinion, but were omitted by the Second
Circuit. Importantly, when NYMEX received copyright for
its database in April 2004-two years after its initial
application-NYMEX filed a Descriptive Statement to the
Copyright Office seeking copyright protection for its
database as a form of "[o]riginal text and compilation. ' 48
Recognizing that the Office would not provide protection to
the settlement prices individually, any discussion of "how
settlement prices are determined" or the amount of
"judgment" involved was omitted from the new statement. 49
Therefore, although NYMEX did not receive protection for
its settlement prices individually, it did receive protection
for its database, which the Office accepted as a compilation
50
of the settlement prices.
Nevertheless, once NYMEX filed suit, the Register of
Copyrights filed a Statement of Interest opposing NYMEX's
claim for copyright in its settlement prices. 51 In addition,
the United States filed an amicus brief claiming that
"settlement prices are facts, even if they are not facts the
idea of the prices have merged with their expression, and
even if merger did not apply, the prices are not
copyrightable because they are short phrases." 52 In light of
the Copyright Office's rejection for the price values, in
addition to the brief filed on behalf of the United States, it
is clear that there is strong outside objection to NYMEX
receiving protection in such values.

48. Id. at 537.
49. Id.
50. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9-10, N.Y Mercantile Exch., Inc.,
497 F.3d at 109 (No. 07-938), 2008 WL 177578 ("In March 2002, NYMEX filed
an application with the U.S. Copyright Office to register its copyright in
NYMEX Settlement Prices. The application was subsequently withdrawn and
replaced with a new application on April 23, 2002, that sought registration of
NYMEX's database, which is a compilation of NYMEX Settlement Prices. On
April 24, 2002, the Copyright Office issued a copyright registration for the
NYMEX database."); see also N.Y Mercantile Exch., Inc., 389 F. Supp. 2d at
539.
51. N.Y Mercantile Exch., Inc., 389 F. Supp. 2d at 539.
52. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. IntercontinentalExch., Inc., 497 F.3d 109,
113 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1669 (2008).
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1. Created or Discovered Facts? The court began its
analysis by setting out the standards for determining
whether a work is the result of original creation or
discovery. One work which copyright protects, as set out in
the Copyright Act, is that of "literary works"-defined as
"works, other than audiovisual works, expressed in words,
numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia,
53
regardless of the nature of the material objects."
Moreover, originality-the "sine qua non," "constitutional
requisite" of copyright-requires that the work be
independently created by the author and it possesses at
least some minimal degree of creativity. 54 Conversely, one
who merely discovers a fact has not created anything.
Rather, discovered facts will never receive copyright
protection and will remain in the public domain, for which
all may access. 55 This distinction may be perceived through
the U.S. Supreme Court's illustration in Feist, which
explained that a census taker does not create a "population
figure," but simply discovers this value based on the
"figures [collected] from the world around them. ' 56 While
the majority claimed that there is a "strong argument" that
NYMEX does not create its settlement prices, it is also
conceded that differentiating between discovery and
creation is incredibly difficult to discern in the context of
settlement prices. 57 Consequently, the majority sidestepped the issue by refusing to determine whether or not
the prices are unoriginal, but-strangely enough-still
proceeded to analyze the originality issue in detail.
The majority began its analysis by considering the basis
of independent creation in NYMEX's prices. In determining
the market value of each individual contract, the court
reasoned that the "market is an empirical reality, an
economic fact about the world, that Committee members
are seeking to discover. 58s The court considered that the
Committee does "not creat[e] predictions or estimates" or
53. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2006)).
54. Id.; Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
55. 497 F.3d at 114 (quoting Feist Publ'ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 348).
56. Id. (quoting Feist Publ'ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 347).
accompanying notes 164-74.
57. N.Y Mercantile Exch., Inc., 497 F.3d at 114.
58. Id. at 115.

See infra text
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decide how the market "should' or "will" value each
contract, but rather,
merely discovers the "one proper
59
settlement price."
The majority's reasoning then turned on comparing
NYMEX's settlement prices with similar cases in which
prices were found to be copyrightable. The court rejected
NYMEX's claim that "[t]he valuations themselves are
original creations" 60-as
well as its reliance on CCC
Information Services, Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Market
Reports (CCC), which granted copyright protection to
estimated prices for used cars. 61 Instead, at what appears to
be the highlight of the decision, the court determined that
"this statement," as it exists in CCC, cannot be accepted as
precedent in the Second Circuit, for it "is arguably dicta." 62
The majority supported its claim by determining that the
CCC court granted protection on the basis of "the selection
and arrangement of data" in a compilation, thus,
characterizing CCCs holding that "individual estimates
were copyrightable" as superfluous. 63 Turning back to the
independent creation discussion, the majority further
distinguished this case from CCC by claiming that CCCs
car values were based on "assumptions about 'average' cars"
which were nothing more than "predictions . . .of expected
values." 64 On the other hand, settlement prices "can be seen
as 'pre-existing facts' about the outside world" that are
merely discovered from "market activity. ' 65 For this reason,
the court also distinguished NYMEX from the Ninth Circuit
case of CDN Inc. v. Kapes66 in which protection was

59. Id.
60. Id. at 115 n.5 (quoting CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt.
Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 67 (2d Cir. 1994)).
61. CCC Info. Servs., Inc., 44 F.3d at 67-68; see infra text accompanying
notes 124-31.
62. N.Y Mercantile Exch., Inc., 497 F.3d at 115 n.5 (citation omitted).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 197 F.3d 1256 (9th Cir. 1999).

292

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5 7

provided to individual price67 valuations in the form of
estimates for collectible coins.
In a strange turn of events, the majority stepped back
from concluding that the prices were discovered facts and
argued how they could be perceived as the result of
creation. It was noted that whether or not the Settlement
Committee's actions were akin to that of discovery was
"disputable" even "for high-volume months"-those months
which the court earlier perceived were determined on a
formulaic basis. 68 Rather, creating a "settlement price is a
more abstract concept than the discovery of a population
figure."69 While a census taker has the ability to gather
information necessary to establish a population figure, "it is
not clear that we could ever precisely calculate the
appropriate valuation of a particular futures contract." 70 As
for the low-volume months, there is "so little trading that
there is no real market," thus making the process "closer to
creation"
or "predictions... of expected values," like that of
71
CCC.

After determining that both the low-volume and highvolume months could be perceived as being created by a
process closer to creation, the bewildered majority
ultimately decided that since this was a "close question,"
they would not "decide whether settlement prices are
unoriginal," and were "particularly reluctant to hold, as a
matter of law, that the Committee . . . discover[ed] the
settlement prices. ' 72 Moreover, the court refused to
"consider the extent of NYMEX's creativity" in its
and
concluded,
price
determinations
settlement
from
protection
alternatively, that the prices are precluded
73
on account of the merger doctrine.

67. Id. at 1260; see infra text accompanying notes 132-38; see also N.Y
Mercantile Exch., Inc., 497 F.3d at 115 (determining that "the prices for
collectible coins in that case were estimates, not discovered market facts").
68. N.Y Mercantile Exch., Inc., 497 F.3d at 115.
69. Id. at 116.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 115-16.
73. Id. at 114 n.4, 115.
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2. The Merger Doctrine Analysis. This leads to the
court's second inquiry, which is whether the settlement
prices can only be expressed in such a limited number of
ways that the merger doctrine must apply. Yet, the court
was immediately struck with the dilemma that, in the
Second Circuit, the merger doctrine only applies to those
items which are copyrightable. Therefore, in another
unforeseeable determination, it was assumed that the
"settlement prices are created and not discovered," and are
therefore "copyrightable"-similar to that of the prices in
CCC and CDN.7 4 Since only the expression of an idea can be
copyrighted, the rule of merger is that "expression is not
protected in those instances where there is only one or so
few ways of expressing an idea that protection of the
expression would effectively accord protection to the idea
itself. ' 75 As noted in the Copyright Act, protection will
never be provided to "any idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery." 76
The majority first considered how to define the "idea" of
NYMEX's prices, recognizing that the definition of that
which constitutes an idea changes on a case by case basis. 77
The court conceded that NYMEX, the district court, and an
amicus brief from the United States all had varying
definitions of how to define the "idea" of a settlement
price. 78 For argument's sake, the majority accepted
NYMEX's approach that the idea may be defined as "a
sound and reasonable opinion of fair market value for each
NYMEX contract," which may be determined by "assessing

74. Id. at 116.
75. Id. at 116-17 (quoting Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d
Cir. 1991)). The majority continued to note that, "[w]e must exercise
'considerable care,' in analyzing merger: 'if the merger doctrine is applied too
readily, arguably available alternative forms of expression will be precluded; if
applied too sparingly, protection will be accorded to ideas."' Id. at 117 (quoting
Kregos, 937 F.2d at 705).

76. Id. at 116 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006)).
77. Id. at 117.

78. Id.

294

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

trades, bids, and offers and. . . off exchange information. ' 79
Nevertheless, even if they were to accept NYMEX's
definition of the settlement price's idea, the range of
possible numbers which could serve as the settlement price
was still not "broad enough" such that any further "possible
expression [would] not 'necessarily be "substantially
similar.""' 8 0 The majority reasoned that since all settlement
prices are expressed in numerical form, and the number
was determined by "the same underlying market facts," the
range of possible variations
for that number appeared to be
"exceptionally narrow. 8 1 While the majority acknowledged
that at times there may be disagreements amongst those on
the Committee as to the settlement prices' numeric value, it
reasoned that the range was not broad enough to restrain
ICE or8 2other competitors from using NYMEX's settlement
prices.
To supplement this argument, the majority explained
that policy considerations "weigh heavily" in determining
whether to apply the merger doctrine in the Second
Circuit.8 3 As such, the court reiterated that one of the
objectives of copyright is to provide "economic incentives" to
authors so they may continue to direct their energies
84
toward the "advancement of knowledge and learning."
Fundamental aspects of copyright law also warn that if
such protection were not offered, authors could possibly
"direct their energies elsewhere, [thus] depriving the public
of their creations. '8 5 The majority argued that such
incentives, however, were not needed by NYMEX, for the
law requires that the exchange report its prices. In

79. Id. (Specifically, NYMEX defined the "idea" as, "a sound and reasonable
opinion of fair market value for each NYMEX contract as of the close of open
outcry trading on the NYMEX floor each day may be achieved by assessing
trades, bids, and offers and (in various instance) off exchange information,
particularly developed late in the trading day.").
80. Id. (quoting Hart v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 86 F.3d 320, 322
(2d Cir. 1996)).
81. Id. at 118.
82. Id.
83. Id. (citing CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc.,
44 F.3d 61, 72 (1994)).
84. Id. (quoting CCC, 44 F.3d at 65).
85. Id. (quoting CCC, 44 F.3d at 66).
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addition, the majority reasoned that NYMEX will not
"direct its energies elsewhere" since "its exchange requires
settlement prices to clear contracts. '8 6 In conclusion, the
court determined that ICE merely took ideas for which the
''copyright law affords no protection"-since the "expression
is essential to the statement of the idea"-and that the
merger doctrine should be applied. 87 Therefore, application
of the merger doctrine for NYMEX's settlement prices
precluded NYMEX from receiving any sort of copyright
protection.
B. Summary of Judge Hall's "Concurrencein Part"
While Judge Hall ultimately agreed with the majority
that the merger doctrine should preclude application of
copyright protection for NYMEX's settlement prices, he
disagreed with the majority's argument that the prices
"lack the requisite originality" for copyright protection.8 8
Moreover, he was leery of the dicta the majority now
created by "heightening the standards by which we
determine whether a work exhibits 'some minimal degree of
89
creativity."
The Supreme Court already indicated in Feist
PublicationsInc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. 90 that the
amount of creativity needed to meet the originality
requirement is "extremely low," despite how "crude, humble
or obvious." 91 Since this creates "a virtually non-existent
bar to NYMEX's efforts to demonstrate the originality of its
work," Judge Hall explained that he "cannot so easily
accept that ICE has made such a 'strong argument' against
the originality of NYMEX's settlement prices. ' 92 Moreover,
Hall found that to alter the originality requirement as
established by the U.S. Supreme Court is "contraindicated
86. Id.
87. Id. at 118 (quoting CCC, 44 F.3d at 68).
88. Id. at 119 (Hall, J., concurring in part).
89. Id. (quoting Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345
(1991)).
90. Feist, 499 U.S. at 340.
91. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc., 497 F.3d at 119 (quoting Feist, 499 U.S. at
345).
92. Id. at 120.
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both by our
jurisprudence and by the procedural posture of
'93
this case.
Finding it necessary to address the creativity issue
which was "skirt[ed]" by the majority, Judge Hall listed
94
three reasons as to why the majority's rationale is flawed.
First, he concluded that the majority "contradict[ed] prior
precedent of this Circuit" by distinguishing the holding in
CCC-which provided protection to individual price
valuations-from NYMEX. 95 He reasoned that just as the
creativity of the individual car price values in CCC "lay in
the integration of 'a multitude of data sources"' and
"professional judgment
and expertise," 96 NYMEX's
settlement prices are generated through "the integration ' of
data sources" and "professional judgment or expertise. 97
Therefore, Judge Hall determined that the majority should
have found that creativity necessarily follows from the
"creation of the settlement price."9 8 On this point, he also
cited to Judge O'Scannlain's Ninth Circuit opinion in
CDN.9 9 As such, he found the majority's reliance on the
theory that NYMEX merely discovers a "price that may or
may not exist at any given point in the trading day"
misplaced.100
Secondly, Judge Hall characterized the majority's
reasoning as "circular."101 The majority's conclusion that
the prices are unoriginal is based on the theory that they
are "discoverable facts, not creations of NYMEX," but failed
102
to explain why they are facts rather than creations.
Judge Hall interpreted this as a declaration that
"settlement prices are facts, and therefore unoriginal; they

93. Id. at 119.
94. Id. at 120.
95. Id.
96. Id. (quoting CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc.,
44 F.3d 61, 67 (1994)).

97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. (citing CDN Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256 (9th Cir. 1999)).
100. Id. at 120.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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are unoriginal because they are facts. ' 10 3 As such, he
emphasized that he could not agree with such a rationale.
Finally, Judge Hall explained that while the settlement
prices do "derive in part from facts" that exist in the world,
it is difficult to characterize the prices as "facts" in their
entirety.104 Rather, "a settlement price is an 'arbitraryprice
used as the basis for the settlement of contracts through a
clearinghouse.' 10 5 The price does "not replicate individual
trades" or a "weighted average" of such trades, but is an
amount "treat[ed] as the final value" of a particular
contract. 10 6 This is evidenced further by the "override
mechanism" which allows the Committee to use their
judgment in adjusting the
figures in order to match a
"better 'arbitrary price."' 10 7 Again, he seemed to echo the
CCC holding by claiming that "many copyright-worthy
creative works derive in part from facts."10 8 Consequently,
Judge Hall determined that "one could easily conclude that
settlement prices are not preexisting facts about the world"
but rather, "evaluative opinions created by NYMEX."1° 9
Nevertheless, he agreed with the majority's argument
regarding the merger doctrine.

III. A DEPARTURE FROM THE PAST ORIGINALITY STANDARD IN
PRICE VALUATIONS

As pointed out by Judge Hall, the Second Circuit's
refusal to determinatively find that an individual price
valuation can meet the originality threshold based on the
integration of multiple data sources and educated judgment
represents a departure from Second Circuit precedent.l °
After the majority's confusing discussion of independent
creation
and
brief-albeit,
unintentional--creativity

103. Id.
104. Id. at 121.
105. Id.

(citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2079

(2002)).
106. Id. at 120-21 (emphasis added).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 121.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 120.
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discussion, the majority warned that "[t]his is not to say
that summary judgment is necessarily inappropriate in
resolving whether the task is one of discovery or
creation." '' Therefore, it is confusing as to why the court
decided not to take a definitive stance on the issues of
independent creation or creativity. One theory is that the
majority abandoned the originality issue and, alternatively,
applied a harsh merger application in order to avoid a
dissent from Judge Hall.'1 2 This sort of side-stepping
behavior almost resembles that of a convoluted form of
avoidance-similar to that in which the U.S. Supreme
Court is occasionally guilty of partaking. 1' 3 In addition,
providing future courts with the authority to apply the
merger doctrine to individual price estimates, without
conducting a definitive creativity analysis, will encourage
the application of a hasty merger doctrine. As such, it is not
surprising that this decision has been characterized
by at
4
least one commentator as "somewhat strained.""
NYMEX's subsequent filing for a rehearing en banc was
denied." 5 Shortly thereafter, a petition for a writ of
certiorari was filed to the U.S. Supreme Court, urging that
these issues be reconsidered in order to ensure the
existence of a uniform copyright law." 6 The Court
responded by issuing an order denying certiorari on March
17, 2008.117 Since the decision will not be reconsidered, this
case should be examined in light of its impact on copyright
law's relation with individual price valuations and the
merger doctrine in the Second Circuit.

111. Id. at 116 n.7 (majority opinion).
112. See Stephen M. Kramarsky, A Missed Opportunity on Creative Works,
238 N.Y. L.J. 5-6 (2007).
113. See LISA A. KLOPPENBERG, PLAYING IT SAFE: How THE SUPREME COURT
SIDESTEPS HARD CASES AND STUNTS THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW 2-3 (2001)

("Avoidance is sometimes a necessary tool on multi-judge courts to reach
consensus. It provides flexibility for judges who cannot completely control their
docket or the presentation of issues in our litigant-driven system.").
114. Kramarsky, supra note 112, at 6.
115. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 50, at 11.
116. Id. at 2.
117. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. IntercontinentalExch., Inc., 497 F.3d 109
(2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1669 (2008).
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A. A Closer Look at Compilation, the Creativity Standard,
and Individual Price Values
Protection for price values may be found through
statutory authority as well as case law. Section 102(a) of
the Copyright Act of 1976 has fundamentally required that
copyright protection only be provided to works that are
original.118 The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Feist
indicated that originality exists when a work is
"independently created by the author" and "possesses at
least some minimal degree of creativity."1' 19 Section 102(a)
also provides eight categories of authorship for which
copyright provides protection-one such category titled,
"literary works," includes works that are expressed in
"numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or
indicia."'120 Alternatively, section 103(a) entails that
copyright protection can be provided to "compilations"
which constitute works "formed by the collection and
assembling of preexisting materials . . . that are selected,
coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting
work as a whole constitutes an original work of
authorship."1 21 The 1976 House Report notes that a
compilation includes "material of all kinds, regardless of
whether the individual items in the material have been or
ever could have been subject to copyright. ' 122 Just as the
Ninth Circuit in CDN considered the issue of whether the
"prices themselves are sufficiently original as compilations
to sustain a copyright"1 23 and held that the "prices were
copyrightable,"1 24 statutory authority in the form of
compilation seems to provide protection for the original

118. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) ("Copyright protection
subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of authorship .... ").
119. Feist Publ'ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (citing 1
MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §§ 2.01[A],

[B]

(1990)).
120. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a)(1) (2006).
121. 17 U.S.C. § 101; see 17 U.S.C. §103 (2006).
122. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 57 (1976).
123. CDN Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256, 1259-60 (9th Cir. 1999) ("The prices
CDN creates are compilations of data that represent its best estimate of the
value of the coins.").
124. Id. at 1260.
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selection or arrangement of material facts which are
subsequently expressed in numerical form-such as a price.
Case law indicates that courts have similarly granted
copyright protection to individual price estimates as
compilations-thus, satisfying the originality standard,
avoiding the merger doctrine, and bypassing the "short
phrases" exclusion developed by the U.S. Copyright
Office. 125 Coincidentally, protection for such works
originated with the very Second Circuit that has now
generated the authority to preclude such works from
protection. CCC dealt with Maclean Hunter's used car price
estimates, which were published eight times a year in a
publication referred to as the Red Book. 126 CCC Information
Services was an online database which republished a large
amount of these values for its own economic gain. 127 As
previously noted, Judge Leval held that the "valuations
themselves are original creations of Maclean" because the
"predictions were based not only on a multitude of data
sources, but
also on professional judgment
and
expertise."'128 Specifically, the court found that Maclean
weighed fifteen considerations in determining its car
values. 129 Consequently, since "each valuation incorporated
the Red Book editors' original judgment," the court found
that "[o]riginal aspects of Red Book's ordination and
arrangement were inextricably present whenever
CCC
copied and republished any Red Book valuation.' 1 30
Shortly thereafter, the Ninth Circuit provided copyright
protection to individual coin prices in CDN. 131 The court
even hung its hat on the Second Circuit's holding in CCC.132
The defendant was an internet-based business which
125. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2007) (The U.S. Copyright Office developed authority
to refuse to grant protection to short phrases in the form of slogans, titles, or
names.).
126. CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, 44 F.3d 61, 63
(2d Cir. 1994).
127. Id. at 64.
128. Id. at 67.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 68 n.8.
131. CDN Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256, 1262 (9th Cir. 1999).
132. Id. at 1260-61 (explaining that "[o]ur holding that the prices are
copyrightable is consistent with that of the Second Circuit in [CCC]").
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utilized the prices that the plaintiff published in a weekly
newsletter, which were "used extensively by dealers" in
collectable coins. 133 In determining the originality of such
prices, the Ninth Circuit found that the coin prices were
determined by the plaintiffs 'considerable expertise and
judgment."' 134 The CDN court found that the consideration
of a "'multitude of variable factors"' enabled the plaintiff to
provide a 'best guess' as to what the current 'bid' and 'ask'
prices" for the coins. 135 Consequently, in addressing the
spark of creativity required by Feist, the Ninth Circuit
stated that the "spark glows in CDN's prices, which are
compilations of136data chosen and weighed with creativity
and judgment."'
NYME is another addition to the line of cases assessing
the extent of copyright protection of individual price values.
However, the Second Circuit has now generated conflict
with the Ninth Circuit by characterizing CCC precedentupon which CDN relied-as dicta. Through an unnecessary
and clearly confusing discussion, the NYME decision has
now thrown into doubt whether integration of data sources
in combination with professional judgment and expertise
can ever be sufficient to satisfy the originality standard for
copyright in price valuations. NYMEX's writ concisely
indicated that: "[i]n CDN, the Ninth Circuit was presented
with the question that NYMEX asked the Second Circuit to
consider in the present case: Are numerical expressions of
opinions of values copyrightable? In contradiction to 137
the
Second Circuit, the Ninth Circuit found that they were."
Similar to the multitude of variable factors 138
considered in CDN, or the fifteen considerations weighed in

133. Id. at 1258.
134. Id. at 1260 (citation omitted).
135. Id. (citation omitted).
136. Id. at 1260.
137. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 50, at 20.
138. CDN Inc., 197 F.3d at 1260. This included "examining the major coin
publications to find relevant retail price information," "review[ing] this data to
retain only that information it consider[ed] to be the most accurate and
important," "extrapolat[ing] from the reported prices to arrive at estimates for
prices for unreported coin types and grades," "consider[ing] the impact of public
auctions and private sales," and "analyz[ing] the effect of the economy and
foreign policies on the price of coins." Id.
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CCC,139 it does not seem as if the Settlement Price
Committee's
measures
of
"consider[ing],
sift[ing],
weigh[ing], and extrapolat[ing] from a wealth of data" are
significantly converse. 140 Yet, neither the district court nor
the Second Circuit provided a definitive answer as to the
creativity of settlement prices for purposes of establishing
originality-despite the fact that the manner in which the
values were determined was discussed in detail when
preliminarily sorting out the facts of the case. 141 As noted
by Judge Hall, since the extremely low creativity standard
set out by Feist merely requires a "creative spark, no matter
how crude, humble or obvious,"'142 it is difficult to argue that
NYMEX would not have been able to reach this threshold.

B. Prices and the Second Circuit's Authority for the
Dicta Standard
The court's characterization of CCCs holding as
"arguably dicta" has further dissipated the standard for
determining originality in price values in copyright law.
Thirteen years after CCC was decided, the NYME majority
is the first court to characterize CCC's protection for
original price valuations in this manner. While it would be
difficult to pinpoint the source, if any, which may have
influenced the majority's opinion on this issue, there seem
to be two recent authorities upon which the court most
likely relied.
First, a copyright treatise written by William Patry,
updated in 2008, raises an argument that is strikingly
similar to that used by the majority to characterize CCC's
holding as dicta, while commenting on the district court

139. CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, 44 F.3d 61, 67
(2d Cir. 1994).
140. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. IntercontinentalExch., Inc., 497 F.3d
109, 111 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1669 (2008) (quoting Brief for
Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellant at 13, N.Y Mercantile Exch., Inc., 497
F.3d 109 (2007) (No. 05-5585-CV), 2006 WL 5432753). The data weighed
included "the volume of trading that day, daily transaction prices, the amount
of orders that remain unfulfilled at the end of that day, and market information
outside of NYMEX." Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 50, at 6.
141. N.Y Mercantile Exch., Inc., 497 F.3d at 114 n.4 ("[W]e-like the district
court-do not consider the extent of NYMEX's creativity.").
142. Id. at 119-20 (Hall, J., concurring in part) (quoting Feist Publ'ns v.
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991)).
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opinion of this very case. 14 3 Patry begins by dismissing the
credibility of CCC, arguing that the "court's discussion of
valuations as individually protectible is dictum" since the
decision also turned on the originality of the Red Book
compilation. 144 Patry further notes that such "dictum is
erroneous." 145 Similarly, the majority supported its
"arguably dicta" statement by alleging that the Red Book in
CCC received protection as a compilation, therefore making
it unnecessary to also hold that the individual values were
copyrightable. 146 In other words, although the majority and
Patry acknowledged that the individual price protection
discussed in CCC is part of that court's holding, it is
interpreted to be superfluous.
Patry's discussion continues by discrediting the type of
protection sought for price estimates in this line of cases as
a whole-that is, CDN, CCC, and the NYME district court
case. He claims that "the error made in CDN, as in CCC's
14 7
confusing judgment with originality."'
dictum, is
14
8
Referring to the NYME district court decision,
Patry
concludes that "judgment about what a fair price is for a
coin, a car, or a commodities futures contract" could never
be protected under copyright. 149 Certainly Patry recognizes
that "[o]riginality will always be the result of judgment,"
but argues that "not all exercises of judgment are
copyrightable." 150 The type of judgment that Patry feels
should be excluded regardless of its creativity is the, "what
ought to be, not what is" principle upon which CDN and
CCC rely. 151 In other words, he asserts that copyright

143. See 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 4:50 (2008).
144. See id.

145. Id.
146. N.Y Mercantile Exch., Inc., 497 F.3d at 115 n.5.
147. See PATRY, supra note 143, § 4.50.

148. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. IntercontinentalExch., Inc., 389 F. Supp.
2d 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff'd, 497 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2007).
149. See PATRY, supra note 143, § 4:50.

150. Id.
151. Id. As addressed previously in this Note, supra Part II, the problem
that arises here is that protection could certainly never be provided to a "what
is" price, now given this court's analysis, simply on the basis that it would
inevitably lead to that price being categorized as a "discovered fact" or an
economical reality of the world.
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protection should never be provided to numerical
estimation regardless of the degree of its creativity.
Conversely, in NYME, the court implicated that if the
prices were estimated rather than discovered, they might be
Nevertheless,
by
able
to
receive
protection. 152
characterizing CCCs holding as dicta, it is questionable as
to whether the Second Circuit will ever again find that a
price is worthy of copyright protection-whether it be an
estimate or discovery.
Secondly, a similar argument exists in the amicus
curiae brief filed by the United States on behalf of ICE on
March 27, 2006.153 In their brief, the Justice Representative
argued that CCC made "passing references to individual
valuations in dicta" and "[t]o the extent these passages in
CCC can be construed to recognize a copyright in individual
valuations, they are erroneous. ' 154 To further discredit the
CCC decision, the United States alleged that "copyright law
does not support" CCCs distinction between "price
'predictions' based on 'professional judgment and expertise'
and 'mechanical derivations of historical prices.' ' 155 Finally,
in an effort to put an end to any such discussion of price
protection, the United States concluded that "[n]o single
price, no matter how derived, is copyrightable." 156 Although
the Justice Representative did not cite to any authority for
this final statement, it is a sure indication that any effort to
grant copyright protection for price estimates in the future
will not pass lightly under its watchful eye. Furthermore,
while precluding prices from protection may have its own
economic benefits, this blunt statement on behalf of the
United States-that no price should ever receive
protection-departs from the past precedent just discussed
and fits more with Patry's ideologies.

152. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. IntercontinentalExch., Inc., 497 F.3d
109, 115 n.5 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1669 (2008).
153. Brief Amicus Curiae of the United States of America in Support of
Defendant-Appellee IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., N.Y Mercantile Exch., Inc.,
F.3d 109 (No. 05-5585), 2006 WL 5316201 [hereinafter Brief for United States
of America].
154. Id. at 15.
155. Id. (quoting CCC Info. Servs, Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports,
Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 67 (2d Cir. 1994)).
156. Id. (emphasis added).
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C. The Independent Creation of a Price: Creationor
Discovery
The NYME court also implicitly raised the standard for
satisfying the independent creation requirement in
compilations. In weighing the independent creation prong,
the Second Circuit first distinguished NYMEX's prices from
those involved in CCC and CDN, finding that the
settlement prices were merely the discovery of a price as
opposed to a creation in the form of an assumption or
estimate. 157 Immediately afterward, the court found itself
conceding the exact opposite premise: that "discovery, even
for high-volume months, is disputable"'158 and the lowvolume months certainly appeared to be "closer to creation"
or prediction like that
of CCC and CDN.159 While the court
"skirt[ed] this issue"1 60 on account of being reluctant to hold
that the Committee discovered the settlement prices for
such months, 161 Judge Hall's fears of the majority
"contradict[ing] prior precedent"'162 through this language
should not go unheeded.
The U.S. Supreme Court set out the standards for
creation and discovery years ago in Feist.163 Since
discovered facts can never be protected,164 Feist
distinguished between discovery and creation for purposes
of explaining how a compilation may be worthy of copyright
protection. 165 The Court stated that the discoverer of a fact
is worthy of no protection for merely "find[ing] and
record [ing]. '"166 On the other hand, creation exists for
"choices as to selection and arrangement" if such selection

157. N.Y Mercantile Exch., Inc., 497 F.3d at 115 n.5, 120.
158. Id. at 115.
159. Id. at 116.
160. Id. at 120 (Hall, J., concurring in part).
161. Id. at 116 (majority opinion).
162. Id. at 120 (Hall, J. concurring in part).
163. See generally Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,
(1991).
164. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
165. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 347.
166. Id.
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or arrangement is creative. 167 Therefore, whether a
compilation should receive copyright protection will
inevitably turn on the compilation's creativity, thus
revealing that a creativity analysis is vital to establishing
the independent creation requirement in compilationsespecially factual compilations.
Feist applied the creativity theory through Rural
Telephone Service Company's attempt to seek copyright
protection in the form of compilation for its phone book
listings. 168 The preexisting facts used by Rural for its
telephone book compilation consisted of names, towns, and
telephone numbers. 169 Feist explained that "[a] factual
compilation is eligible for copyright if it features an original
selection or arrangement of facts.' 170 However, after
assessing the creativity involved in the selection and
arrangement of the material used to generate the phone
book, the Court found that the listings were not worthy of
copyright protection. Specifically, as to selection, the Court
found that selecting the "most basic information-name,
town, and telephone number-[of] each person who applies
to it for telephone service" lacked the "creativity necessary
to
transform
mere
selection
into
copyrightable
171
expression.'
More precisely, selecting information,
172
standard to any phone book, "could not be more obvious."'
Turning to arrangement, the facts were arranged in
alphabetical order, which the court found to be "not only
unoriginal" but "practically inevitable."'' 73 The discovered,
low-level creative Feist telephone listings seem a far cry
from the settlement prices at issue in NYME.
While a price would most likely not be able to satisfy
compilation on the basis of arrangement, 174 the prices

167. Id. at 348.
168. See id. at 340.
169. Id. at 363.
170. Id. at 350 (emphasis added).
171. Id. at 362.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 363.
174. Trying to establish the creative arrangement for an individual price is
complicated, although the CCC court seemed to provide authority on this issue
by finding that "aspects of [the] Red Book's ordination and arrangement were
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themselves could very well satisfy the requisites for
compilation on the basis of selection alone. Each day the
Committee determines a settlement price value for thirtytwo or thirty-three months of crude-oil and seventy-two
months for natural gas-either 104 or 105 settlement prices
a day. 175 While the high-volume months only encompass a
small number of all delivery months, 176 the majority of
trades are based on these contracts, for "[t]here is generally
less trading in contracts for the outer months." 177 As
already indicated, for the low-volume months, NYMEX
"considers, sifts, weighs and extrapolates from a wealth of
data,"1 78 which has certainly satisfied the creative threshold
for selection in the past. 179 The problem mainly lies with
determining how to characterize the high-volume months.
At one point, the majority explained that the high-volume
months are "based on a formula.' ' 80 If true, the high-volume
months would be unable to receive protection as a
"procedure, process, system, [or] method of operation" under
Section 102 of the Copyright Act.' 8 ' Similarly, the Third
Circuit, in Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., explained that
a number's value generated by a system may not receive
copyright protection since it lacks the requisite creativity. 8 2
Nevertheless, the majority also revealed that "it is not clear
inextricably present whenever CCC copied and republished any Red Book
valuation." CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d
61, 68 n.8 (2d Cir. 1994) (emphasis added). Similarly, Feist noted that although
facts that make up a compilation may not be protected, "if the compilation
author clothes facts with an original collocation of words, he or she may be able
to claim a copyright in this written expression." Feist, 499 U.S. at 348. While
this may be language which would enable the settlement price to be worthy of
copyright protection based on arrangement alone-since the facts are clothed in
a numerical value-the argument may not be well received.
175. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. IntercontinentalExch., Inc., 497 F.3d
109, 111, 116 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 1669 (2008).
176. Id. at 111.
177. Id. at 116.
178. Id.
179. See id. at 120 (Hall, J. concurring in part).
180. Id. at 111 (majority opinion).
181. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
182. Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276, 282 (3d Cir. 2004).
(explaining that numbers which were assigned to screw fasteners which are
generated solely based on a mechanical system do not contain the "slightest
element of creativity") (emphasis added).
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that we could ever precisely calculate the appropriate
valuation of a particular futures contract"'183 and Judge Hall
emphasized that the settlement price does not replicate a
weighted average, but involves the Committee's judgment
or opinion in order to determine an "arbitrary price."' 8 4 The
factual dispute regarding this value therefore reveals that
more than a precise formula or system dictates the
settlement price calculations for either the high or lowvolume months.
If the "judgment or opinion"'18 5 of the selection involved
in determining a NYMEX settlement price value for a
certain commodity was as "entirely typical," "garden
variety," or "obvious"'1 6 as selecting phone numbers and
additional personal information of citizens of a town, ICEand any other commodity trader which has a licensing
agreement with NYMEX-would have no reason to use
NYMEX's values. Litigation such as this would never have
even ensued. This reveals the degree of "judgment or
opinion"'18 7 involved in the creation of NYMEX's settlement
prices and quashes any issue of mere "sweat of the brow."' 88
Certainly, the problem that the court faced was that
there were facts upon which NYMEX relied in creating its
prices during the high-volume periods. Yet, even if NYMEX
uses facts to generate its prices for high-volume months,
there is no reason why the prices as a whole may not
receive copyright protection. Specifically, it seems that the
low-volume months are compilations, while the highvolume months are compilations of facts. The Court found
that "even a directory that contains . . .only facts, meets
the constitutional minimum for copyright protection if it
features an original selection or arrangement [of such
facts]."'1 9 The red flag here is that "[t]here remains a
narrow category of works in which the creative spark is

183. NY. MercantileExch., Inc., 497 F.3d
at 116.
0
184. Id. at 121 (Hall, J., concurring in part).
185. Id.
186. Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.3d 700, 705 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting
Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)).
187. N.Y MercantileExch., Inc., 497 F.3d at 121.
188. Feist Publ'ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 353.
189. Id. at 348 (emphasis added).
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utterly lacking or so trivial as to be virtually
nonexistent."1 90
Therefore, it is understood that for "compilations of
facts, independent creation as to selection and arrangement
will not assure copyright protection; the requirement of
minimal creativity becomes an important ingredient of the
test for copyright entitlement."19 1 In other words, in
assessing independent creation in a compilation of facts,
creativity has to be weighed in order to determine whether
the compilation was created or discovered. Whether that
level of creativity was met here is uncertain, given the
court's refusal to consider this analysis. However, to even
hint at issues of creation or discovery without weighing
erroneous interpretation of the analysis as
creativity is an 192
set out in Feist.
Due to the inseparability of creativity and independent
creation for compilations of fact, in assessing the originality
of the high-volume months, the court made a grave error in
failing to consider the degree of creativity used by the
NYMEX Settlement Price Committee. 193 While the Second
Circuit may be correct in indicating that settlement prices
appear to be more in the way of factual discovery during
high-volume months, such a determination should not even
be alleged without a creativity analysis as to the given
selection involved. For this reason, the Second Circuit's
analysis was incomplete and could prove harmful for
further cases relating to factual compilation.
IV. AN ABUSIVE MERGER DOCTRINE

The merger doctrine establishes that when there is

"only one or so few ways of expressing an idea ...protection

of the expression would effectively accord protection to the

190. Id. at 359.
191. Kregos, 937 F.3d at 704 (emphasis added).
192. See also id.; see generally Feist Publ'ns, Inc., 499 U.S. 340.
193. See N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. IntercontinentalExch., Inc., 497 F.3d
109, 114 n.4 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1669 (2008).
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idea itself."194 Providing protection for an idea prevents
others from further building upon that idea for purposes of
innovation, consequently hindering the advancement of
knowledge. 195 As scholar Melville Nimmer concisely stated,
"[t]o grant property status to a mere idea would permit
withdrawing the idea from the stock of materials that
would otherwise be open to other authors, thereby
narrowing the field of thought open for development and
exploitation."196 The doctrine is invoked when determining
whether a work is precluded from copyright protection
pursuant to 17 U.S.C § 102(b). 197
Due to the ad hoc basis of the merger doctrine's use, its
application is not always consistent. 198 Moreover, the
merger doctrine has certainly received its fair share of
criticism as "based on a faulty premise," 199 "merely a
judgment that there is a lack of originality, ' 200 "worth little

194. Kregos, 937 F.2d at 705. For example, in Morrissey v. Procter& Gamble
Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1967), there was only a number of limited
ways one could express "sweepstake game rules" such that to give the plaintiff
copyright protection would provide for a potential monopoly over the work.
Similarly, in Veeck v. Southern Bldg. Code Congress International, Inc., 293
F.3d 791, 802 (5th Cir. 2002), it was found that since a city building code could
only be expressed in one way, it would be unable to receive copyright protection.

195. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 97 (2003); see also Morrissey, 379
F.2d at 678-79 ("When the uncopyrightable subject matter is very narrow, so
that "the topic necessarily requires"... if not only one form of expression, at
best only a limited number, to permit copyrighting would mean that a party or
parties, by copyrighting a mere handful of forms, could exhaust all possibilities
of future use of the substance . . . . [Ilt is necessary to say that the subject
matter would be appropriated by permitting the copyrighting of its
expression.").
196. CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d
61, 69 n.11 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[B] at 13-69 to 70 (2008)).
197. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) (explaining that
copyright protection for original works does not extend to "any idea, procedure,
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless
of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied").
198. CCC Info. Servs., Inc., 44 F.3d at 68-69.
199. See PATRY, supra note 143, §4:46 ("The [merger] doctrine is, however,
based on a faulty premise: If an idea and its alleged expression are truly
inseparable, there can be no selectivity sufficient to permit originality.").
200. Id.
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as an analytical tool,"20 1 "notoriously malleable," 20 2 and a
"harsh application of the idea-expression dichotomy. 20 3
Similarly, in NYME, the merger doctrine was bluntly
applied in order to conclude that copyright protection
should not be granted to settlement prices. 20 4 The court
refused to grant copyright protection to NYMEX's prices on
the basis of merger for two reasons: (1) since any futures
contract could be determined based on the "same
underlying market facts," the number of ways in which a
settlement price may be expressed is "exceptionally narrow"
and (2) that, as a matter of policy, NYMEX does not need
the incentives provided by copyright in order to continue
creating its settlement prices. 205 In addressing both of these
arguments, this Section will examine the abuses which
result from applying the merger doctrine to amorphous
valuations and how NYMEX's financial incentives are not

much different from that of other businesses in private
industry.
A. The Scope of Settlement Price Expression

A leading case in the Second Circuit for guidance on
applying the merger doctrine is Kregos v. Associated

201. Scott Abrahamson, Seen One, Seen Them All? Making Sense of the
Copyright Merger Doctrine,45 UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1127 (1998).
202. Justin Hughes, Created Facts and the Flawed Ontology of Copyright
Law, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 43, 91 (2007)
203. Edward Samuels, The Idea-ExpressionDichotomy in Copyright Law, 56
TENN. L. REV. 321, 383 (1989).

204. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. IntercontinentalExch., Inc., 497 F.3d
109, 116 n.8 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1669 (2008) ("In this circuit,
consideration of the merger doctrine takes place in light of the alleged copying
to determine if infringement has occurred, rather than in analyzing the
copyrightability of the original work." (quoting CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean
Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 72 n.26 (2d Cir. 1994)).
205. Id. at 118. The court itself seemed a bit confused on the basis of
determining how to apply the merger doctrine. While the majority first
explained that, in a merger analysis, this circuit looks to the range of possible
ways in which settlement prices may be expressed, it is then noted that "[t]he
appropriate inquiry focuses not on the exact quantity of possible expressions
but on the effect of granting copyright protection." Id. at 117 n.9. Yet, the court
seems to turn its decision on the quantity of that expression by basing its
determination on the "possible range" in which settlement price numbers may
be expressed. Id. at 118.
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Press.206 In Kregos, the Second Circuit began its merger
analysis by considering the ideas selected for a "pitching
form" compilation in an effort to determine whether these
ideas could only be expressed in a narrow number of
ways. 20 7 In determining the "narrowness" of an idea, the
court distinguished between selections which "advance the
understanding of phenomena or the solution of problems"also referred to as "building-block ideas explaining
processes or discoveries"-from those infused with "taste or
opinion." 20 For those selections which involve opinion,
there "is no serious risk that withholding the merger
doctrine will extend protection to an idea." 20 9 On the other
hand, for instances where the selection of data results in a
"precise" or "better-than-average probability of some
result," the merger doctrine should be applied.2 10
The problem with strictly applying the merger doctrine
to NYMEX's settlement prices is that the prices themselves
are amorphous. That is, the high-volume months certainly
could produce a more accurate probability of the value of a
particular contract and therefore be perceived as more of a
fact based idea under the Kregos analysis. Yet, for the lowvolume months during which there are no underlying
market facts upon which to rely, settlement prices seem to
be more the type of "soft ideas infused with taste or opinion"
for which Kregos permits protection. This reveals that the
measures developed by the Second Circuit in the past to
help guide courts through a merger doctrine analysis do not
easily graft on to both the low and high-volume settlement
prices when considered as a whole. Even if the high-volume
months are more factually based, the court would have been
more thorough in applying the Kregos analysis, for it has
been warned that "courts have been cautious in applying
the merger doctrine to selections of factual information."211
For close cases like the one at hand-in which the majority
of materials incorporate opinion-infused ideas rather than

206. Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d Cir. 1991).
207. Id.
208. CCC Info. Servs., Inc., 44 F.3d at 71 & n.22.
209. Kregos, 937 F.2d at 707.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 705.
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building-block facts of discovery-the consequences of
applying the merger doctrine are abusively overreaching.
1. The Court's Interpretation of an "Exceptionally
Narrow" Range. While Kregos provides a bright-line
analysis for determining when a work's expression is too
narrow, the limited guidance provided by the court on the
issue of range was simply that "'one or so few ways of
expressing an idea"' 212 is not enough, while "choices among
many possible means" is sufficient. 213 Ultimately, the court
determined that the expression of the settlement price was
"exceptionally narrow" on the basis that "any settlement
price for a particular futures contract would be determined
based on the same underlying market facts. ' 214 The
problem here is that the court just finished conceding that,
as to the low-volume months-for which the majority of
settlement price estimates are made-there "is
so little
trading that there is no real market to speak of."'215
Without having facts upon which to rely, it would be
difficult to argue that the material used to determine the
prices would therefore be the same, such that the
settlement price expression would be exceptionally narrow.
A more glaring error here is that the majority inadvertently
attempted to distinguish itself from the CCC court, which
came to the exact opposite conclusion. This was criticized by
scholar, Justin Hughes, as "an unsatisfactory way to
distinguish the NYMEX ruling from Maclean Hunter;
dissension from the Red Book used car values may also be
'exceptionally
narrow,'
particularly
on
insurance
'
2
1
6
compensation.
Since insurance companies for certain
states are required by statute to determine car values based

212. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. IntercontinentalExch., Inc., 497 F.3d
109, 116-17 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1669 (2008) (quoting Kregos,
937 F.2d at 705).
213. Id. at 117 (quoting Merkos L'Inyonei Chinuch, Inc. v. Otsar Sifrei
Lubavitch, Inc., 312 F.3d 94, 99 (2d Cir. 2002)).
214. Id. at 118.
215. Id. at 116.
216. Justin Hughes, Created Facts and the Flawed Ontology of Copyright
Law, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 43, 77 (2007).
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on the Red Book, price estimates
in this context do not vary
217
from one another in the least.
A closer look at the settlement prices further indicates
that characterizing the price expression as narrow is
nothing more than a meaningless, blanket statement.
Every day, either 104 or 105 settlement prices are
determined, 218 each of which are expressed as a numerical
value to one-hundredth of a point. 219 With 105 prices,
intricately valued to one-hundredth of a point on a daily
basis, largely based on periods where there is "no real
market to speak of,"2 20 it would be difficult to argue that
this results in an exceptionally narrow range of values. On
the contrary, ICE's method of changing NYMEX's
settlement price "one 'tick"' and NYMEX's ability to
"override" such prices reveals that settlement prices are
estimations that need not be an exact numeric value
dictated by market facts. 221 Clearly the less factual material
there is upon which to rely, the more creativity must be
used in determining the value; the more creativity involved
in determining that value clearly reveals the broader range
in which that value may be expressed. In overlooking these
factors, the view that the possible variations are too narrow
is nothing more than a subjective statement without any
factual support.
2. Inconsistent Merger Doctrine Application Amongst
the Circuits. In Kregos, Judge Newman warned that "[i]f the
compiler's idea is identified at that low level of abstraction,
then the idea would always merge into the compiler's
expression of it. ' ' 222 Therefore, depending on how abstract
the court defines the idea, one could always claim that the

217. "The offer of this average of Red Book and Bluebook satisfies a market
because the laws of certain states use that average figure as a minimum for
insurance payments upon the 'total loss' of a vehicle." CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v.
Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 64 (2d Cir. 1994).
218. See N.Y Mercantile Exch., Inc., 497 F.3d at 111.
219. See, e.g., KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 5, at 95 fig.3.1 (Futures Price
Quotations);
see
also
NYMEX.com:
Light
Sweet
Crude
Oil,
http://www.nymex.com/lsco futpso.aspx (last visited Oct. 24, 2008).
220. N.Y MercantileExch., Inc., 497 F.3d at 116.
221. Id. at 111-12.
222. Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 706 (2d Cir. 1991).
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idea merges with the expression.223 This provides a great
deal of leeway to judges and can make for a subjective
ruling as to when the merger doctrine application should
keep copyright from granting protection.
The Second Circuit began its merger analysis by
assuming that the settlement prices are "created and not
discovered. 224 At that point in the analysis, the settlement
prices are no different than those of the price values in CCC
and CDN; the court assumed that the values are
sufficiently original for copyright protection. However,
whereas the court found in CCC and CDN that the idea of
individual price values did not merge with the expression of
their values, the Second Circuit here found that the merger
doctrine did in fact apply. Consequently, as once again
indicated in NYMEX's writ to the Supreme Court, the
"Second Circuit's holding that the merger doctrine bars
copyright protection of numerical expressions of opinions of
values directly conflicts with the Ninth Circuit's decision in
CDN Inc. v. Kapes.'' 225
Moreover, while the Ninth Circuit in CDN defined the
"idea" as that of "creating a wholesale price guide," it found
that CDN could utilize copyright law to protect its
expression of "what those prices are. ' 226 Conversely, the
court in NYME claimed that regardless of how the idea may
be defined, "[t]o grant NYMEX copyright protection here
'would effectively accord protection to the idea itself ... bar
ICE or other competitors from valuing NYMEX's
contracts. ' 227 However, if the idea were (to borrow slightly
from Judge Hall's discussion of settlement prices, in which

223. See 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §

13.03[B][3] (2007) ("Unfortunately, as with the idea/expression dichotomy that
pervades this area, application of the merger doctrine depends on the level of
abstraction at which one defines the 'idea' that merges with the subject
expression." (citation omitted)).
224. N.Y. MercantileExch., Inc., 497 F.3d at 116.
225. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, .supranote 50, at 20; see also Reply Brief
of Petitioner at 5, N.Y Mercantile Exch. Inc., 497 F.3d 109 (No. 07-938), 2008
WL 534804 (Heading: "A Circuit Court Split Exists Between the Second and
Ninth Circuits").
226. CDN Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256, 1262 (9th Cir. 1999).
227. N.Y Mercantile Exch., Inc., 497 F.3d at 118 (quoting Kregos, 937 F.2d
at 705).
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he defined them as "arbitrary price[s]") 228 'creating an
arbitrary commodity value database,' it seems that the
possibilities of expressing those values avoids the merger
doctrine based on the CDN methodology. Therefore,
NYMEX's writ accurately indicates that the NYME court
generated a circuit court split due to the "doctrinal
difference" amongst the circuits in their application of the
when to preclude
merger doctrine in properly determining
229
individual price values from protection.
B. Merger and Policy: The Need for Incentives
Finally, the Second Circuit noted that policy
considerations have a significant influence on determining
whether or not to apply the merger doctrine. 230 For
example, in order to determine whether the Red Book
should receive the incentives for protection of its creation,
the court in CCC sought to "balance the conflicts and
contradictions that pervade the law of copyright" in order to
conclude "as a policy judgment, which of its commands
prevails over the other."231 The Second Circuit provided
copyright protection to Maclean's estimated car prices on
the basis that it needed the incentive of copyright
protection in order to continue to partake in its business
rather than "direct [its] energies elsewhere. '232 Similarly,
copyright was provided to CDN's prices (and the merger
doctrine was avoided) on the basis that this protection
provides CDN with an "incentive to create such a guide"
and "allows CDN's competitors to create their own price
233
guides and thus furthers competition."

228. Id.

at 120 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY

2079 (2002)).
229. Reply Brief of Petitioner, supra note 225, at 6.
230. N.Y MercantileExch., Inc., 497 F.3d at 118.
231. CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d
61, 68 (2d Cir. 1994).
232. Id. at 66; see also 497 F.3d at 118; Hughes, supranote 202, at 100 ("Yet
assuming that some economic incentive was needed for creation of the
expressions (which created the facts), if the merger doctrine strips away the
copyright protection, we will destroy the incentive for the creation of the next
iteration of the Red Book or the CDN Coin Dealer .... ).
233. CDN Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256, 1262 (9th Cir. 1999).
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However, the majority in NYME felt that NYMEX did
not need the "economic incentives" provided by copyright in
order to continue to generate settlement prices. 234 The court
reasoned that, first of all, NYMEX must have a price at
which to settle open positions in order to function as a
commodity exchange and, secondly, is required by law to
record and report such prices publicly anyway. 235 The first
argument seems too simplistic-just because NYMEX needs
to have a price in order to function as a commodity
exchange does not necessarily mean that it has to create the
price itself. NYMEX could just as easily take ICE's position
by waiting for another market to generate a price and copy
that price for its own use.
Secondly, the fact that NYMEX has to report its prices
to the public certainly does not mean that the exchange
does not have a property interest in its settlement prices.
On the contrary, NYMEX's contention is not that ICE uses
its settlement prices after the information is reported to the
public before the next trading day, but is "based on ICE's
unlawful copying of NYMEX Settlement Prices before those
settlement prices are required to be made available to the
public."236 Providing NYMEX with the ability to compel
other exchanges to enter into licensing agreements in order
to receive settlement price information is evidence that
property rights in such prices have already been well
recognized. 237 Moreover, it reveals that intellectual property
protection for settlement prices will "not inflict injury on
the opportunity for public debate" 238 or impede the
advancement of knowledge. 239 Rather, selling the prices for
economic gain through these agreements with other
commodity exchanges-and the substantial economic
benefit received from these agreements 240-reveals that the

234. See N.Y MercantileExchange, Inc., 497 F.3d at 112.
235. See id. at 112.
236. Reply Brief of Petitioner, supra note 225, at 1.
237. LEE, supra note 31, at 103-04.
238. CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d
61, 73 (2d Cir. 1994).
239. N.Y Mercantile Exchange, Inc., 497 F.3d at 118.
240. See KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 5, at 100 ("The sale of real-time
transaction prices, quotations, and other market data is a huge source of
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profitable business run by NYMEX is not much different
from those private businesses in CCC or CDN. In fact, once
the settlement prices are publicly reported, the prices are
no longer of any economic value to NYMEX. Consequently,
the fact that NYMEX is required to report its settlement
prices has no bearing on its property interest in such prices.
Using this policy argument to keep NYMEX from
receiving protection for its prices seems forced. Claiming
that one should not receive protection for property simply
because it has to be publicly reported overlooks the fact that
there is actual value in settlement prices-even if such
value only exists for a limited period of time. Moreover, due
to the powerful nature of the merger doctrine, the next
Section examines how courts should take into account
policy arguments which incorporate the public welfare,
rather than merely concentrating on the private incentives
needed for a business to generate materials.
V. MANIPULATION AND EXCESSIVE SPECULATION IN THE
MARKET: A DEGENERATIVE BREED OF COMPETITION

In the world of copyright, competition is good. 241 Rivalry
in the marketplace keeps prices at marginal cost and
generates
economic efficiency
for the benefit of
consumers. 242 Therefore, courts are generally leery of
providing too much protection to a product or devise which
may directly confer a monopoly to a thriving entity. On the
other hand, with the rise of new forms of trading technology
in the futures markets, "exchanges have become
increasingly attentive to possibilities for patenting, traderevenue for financial exchanges such as the Chicago Mercantile Exchange
(CME) and the CBOT.").
241. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 195, at 23 ("A fundamental principle
of American law is that competition is not a tort, that is, an invasion of a legally
protected right. Freedom to imitate, to copy, is a cornerstone of competition and
operates to minimize monopoly profits.").
242. See id. at 378-79; see also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 223, at app.
17-6 (Letter to Hon. Robert Kastenmeier, Chairman, Subcommittee on Courts,
Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice from the Assistant Attorney
General (July 27, 1976) ("Copying very often supports and promotes
competition-it spurs further invention and innovation, permits newcomers to
enter markets, and ... is a necessary condition for the competitive forces of the
marketplace acting to lower prices, satisfy consumer demand, and allocate
production optimally.")).
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marking, or copyrighting their intellectual property. '243
Preserving incentives for creation and encouraging free
competition are competing aspects of copyright. For this
reason, it is only natural that very close cases turn on
arguments of policy which revert back to fundamental
aspects of intellectual property law.
As explained in the earlier merger doctrine discussion,
policy measures in the form of "preserving incentives" took
on a significant role for the NYME court in determining
whether or not copyright protection should be granted. 244
Notwithstanding this argument, one additional policy
measure that should have at least been considered by the
Second Circuit is the economic benefit which could have
been provided to the public if protection were provided to
NYMEX's settlement prices. As is often times the case in
intellectual property battles, disputes which appear to exist
only between two parties will "almost invariably touch the
public welfare." 245 In particular, copyright is a "publicminded law" which is ultimately "intended to inure to the
public" rather than the contesting private parties. ' 246 In
addition, protecting the public interest is a measure that
courts have considered when assessing preliminary
injunction and misappropriation claims for financial
information in the past.247 Grafting this policy onto a
merger doctrine analysis would enable the courts to
approach copyright issues from a broader economic
perspective-rather than solely considering the incentives
necessary for a private party to generate potentially
copyrightable material.

243. KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 5, at 68.

244. See supra Part IV.
245. Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal
Protectionof Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1167 (1948).
246. Note, Rethinking Copyright for Advertisements, 119 HARV. L. REV.
2486, 2492 (2006) ("Copyright is a public-minded law, the benefit of which is
intended to inure to the public, not to the private party whose works are
protected; the doctrine's conferral of a private benefit is merely a means to the
public end.").
247. See, e.g., Standard & Poor's Corp. v. Commodity Exchange, Inc., 683
F.2d 704, 712 (2d Cir. 1982) ("The need to protect the public from such an
eventuality is a strong ground for the maintenance of a preliminary
injunction.").
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This Section examines how granting copyright
protection to NYMEX's settlement prices could have
provided U.S. consumers, as a whole, with vast economic
benefits. First, the regulations of ICE and NYMEX are
explained in detail. Second, this Section considers how
ICE's use of NYMEX's settlement prices for its own "lookalike" instruments promotes market manipulation and
speculation to the detriment of the economy. Third, it will
examine how action is largely underway in remedying these
harms and how granting copyright protection for settlement
prices could have mitigated such harm. Finally, it will
examine how utilizing another exchange's settlement prices
hinders innovation in the market.
A. Inconsistent Regulations Amongst the Markets
To fully understand how manipulation takes place, one
must first understand how NYMEX and ICE are regulated.
ICE and NYMEX are both regulated under different
entities due to an amendment to the Commodity Exchange
Act (CEA) referred to as the "Enron Loophole." 248 This
loophole was the result of the passage of the Commodity
Futures Modernization Act (CFMA) in 2000.249 In fact, ICE
and Enron were both direct beneficiaries from this
251
amendment. 250 While NYMEX is an open-outcry
exchange which maintains its trading floor in New York

248. See 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(3) (2006); see also 153 CONG. REC. S11,596-97 (daily
ed. Sept. 17, 2007) (statement of Sen. Levin) [hereinafter Statement of Sen.
Levin], available at http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/release.cfm?id=283461;
Lynn Garner, Sen. Levin Shopping Amendment To Farm Bill on Energy Market
Oversight, 39 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1754 (Nov. 12, 2007).
249. ANTONIA JUHASZ, THE TYRANNY OF OIL 147-48 (2008) ("Without any
congressional hearings or debate, or any public notice, on December 12, 2000,
Phil Gramm slipped what would forever be referred to as the 'Enron Loophole'
into the 262-page Commodity Futures Modernization Act, of which he was a
sponsor. The act was then belatedly but quite suddenly attached to the 11,000page omnibus appropriations bill that was passed into law by Congress and
signed by President Clinton.").
250. See id. at 148 ("There were two immediate beneficiaries of the loophole:
the Intercontinental Exchange and Enron.").
251. JULIAN ROCHE, FORECASTING COMMODITY MARKETS 225 (1995) (open

outcry is a "method of public auction for making verbal bids and offers for
contracts in the trading pits or rings of commodity (and financial) exchanges.").
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City and also offers electronic trading, 252 ICE is exclusively
an electronic market which provides a trading platform for
physical commodities and over-the-counter derivative
contracts (OTC's). 253 While NYMEX maintains its own
clearing house, ICE clears its transactions through the
London Clearing House in Europe. In addition, although
ICE is headquartered in Atlanta, it trades its energy
futures overseas through a subsidiary, ICE Futures
Europe. 254 Therefore, while NYMEX is "tied to the trading
floors" in the United States, 255 ICE trades electronically and
internationally.
ICE is an Exempt Commercial Market (ECM), which
means that it is "not fully regulated" 256-or is "regulated
the Commodity Futures
and monitored lightly"257-by
Trading Commission (CFTC). 258 In contrast, NYMEX is a
Designated Contract Market (DCM) and Self Regulatory
Organization (SRO) 25 9 which is subject to full oversight by
252. KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 5, at 5.

253. See N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. IntercontinentalExch., Inc., 497 F.3d
109, 110 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1669 (2008).
254. See Richard Hill, CFTC Announces Initiatives to 'Bring Sunshine' to
Energy Markets, 40 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 868 (June 2, 2008).
255. See Jerry W. Markham, 13A Commodities Reg. (West) § 28:3 (2007)
("The floor members... were loathe to give up the time and place advantage on
the floor to an electronic forum where everyone has equal access. . . . [T]he
exchanges and their members saw their volume being eroded by more nimble
competitors.
256. Lynn Garner, Futures Trading: Senate Democrats Express Frustration
With CFTC in Regulating Energy Markets, 40 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 910
(June 9, 2008).
257. Richard Hill, CFTC Sues Amaranth Funds Over Two Days of Nymex
Trading in '06, 39 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1186 (July 30, 2007).
258. See also HEARING, supra note 7, at 22 ("Exempt commercial markets
are electronic trading facilities that restrict trading to principal-to-principal
transactions between eligible commercial entities."); Richard Hill, Lawmakers
Pass CFTC Reauthorization;Senators Query Agency on MOU with London, 40
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 806 (May 19, 2008); HOLDINGS, supra note 6, at 9
("For instance, the IntercontinentalExchange Inc. ('ICE'), an electronic trading
system for, among other things, various OTC energy products, was created by
several large merchant energy companies and currently operates as an 'exempt
commercial market' under the CFMA.").
259. See HOLDINGS, supra note 6, at 2 ("Trading on the Exchange is
regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission ('CFTC'), which, in
conjunction with the Company's clearinghouse, helps to ensure the integrity of
its markets.")
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the CFTC. 2 60 The CFIA has allowed ICE to trade "lookalike" OTC's and contracts-in the form of Henry Hub
natural gas and West Texas Intermediate crude oil. 26 1 Once
ICE relies on NYMEX's settlement prices for these two
financial instruments, the contracts and OTC's are almost
identical. Consequently, traders view ICE and NYMEX as a
262
single market.
The glaring problem with the two exchanges relying on
the same settlement prices is that each is subject to varying
degrees of transparency. In the futures market,
transparency means the "degree to which a futures
exchange publicly disseminates real-time information on
transaction prices, quotations, order flow, and other market
variables. ' 263 The biggest problem with the conflicting
regulations is that ECMs like ICE provide an "end-run
around" the transparency requirements to which DCMs are
subject. 264 Since the success of NYMEX is based on "its
ability to maintain and increase its trading volume," it is
"adversely affected" by "los[ing] customers to low-cost
competitors with fewer regulatory restrictions. ' 265 Concisely
stated, NYMEX is closely monitored by the CFTC, while
ICE-specifically,
ICE Futures Europe-is subject to less
26 6
U.S. regulation.

260. See Garner, supra note 256, at 910.
261. See HOLDINGS, supra note 6, at 9 ('Moreover, the [Commodity Futures
Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA)] increased the ability of competitors to offer
largely unregulated competing products that are economically or otherwise
financially-equivalent to futures contracts.").
262. HEARING, supra note 7, at 39. It is also speculated that "when two
markets are linked in this way, both markets may constitute a price discovery
market for the commodity in question, as it is difficult if not impossible to split
the two and assign the price discovery role to a single marketplace." Id. at 42.
Consequently, it has been noted that "it may be appropriate for the Commission
to reconsider its price discovery criteria to include an additional standard for
linked markets." Id.
263. KOLB & OVERDAHL, supranote 5, at 56.

264. Hill, supra note 258, at 806.
265. HOLDINGS, supra note 6, at 29.
266. See Richard Hill, Futures Trading: CFTC Amending No-Action Stance
With London Market, Demanding More Data, 40 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 983
(June 23, 2008).
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B. Manipulation in the Market
OTC look-alike swaps-like the natural gas and crude
oil financial instruments at issue in NYME--can have a
complimentary relationship with futures contracts by
enabling those who trade swaps to "hedge the risk in their
swap portfolios" by simultaneously trading on other futures
markets. 267 On the other hand, since ICE is exempt from
commission oversight authority under the CEA, 2 68 this can
allow manipulative behavior to go "undetected. '269
Therefore, trades that take place on less transparent
markets, like ICE, serve as a means to further
manipulation and excessive speculation, which ultimately
0
generates an unhealthy form of market volatility.27
In September of 2007, a CFTC conference in
Washington, D.C. brought to light the fact that allowing
unregulated entities like ICE to use "cash-settled, lookalike contracts" provided "an incentive to manipulate the
settlement price of the underlying regulated contract
market price in order to benefit from positions in the look-

267. KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 5, at 54.

268. See Markham, supra note 255, § 27:12.1 (discussing how the exempt
commercial markets which trade electronically are not overseen by the CFTC);
see also HEARING, supra note 7, at 36 ("[U]nder the Commodity Exchange Act,
the Commission staff does not directly surveil or monitor trading activity on
ECMs on an ongoing basis as it does for the regulated contract markets.").
269. HEARING, supra note 7, at 8-9. Since only "part of the natural gas
futures market is regulated," this allows for trading abuses to "plague existing
energy markets" through "price manipulation and excessive speculation."
Statement of Sen. Levin, supranote 248, at S11,596.
270. See Hill, supra note 266, at 983 (explaining that "[o]bservers have
warned that such overseas 'look-alike' contracts can encroach on price
discovery, but that the markets on which they trade are opaque to U.S.
regulators"). Volatility is the "degree of fluctuation in the price of the
underlying futures contract" and the "greater the volatility of the futures, the
higher the option premium." ROBERT D. EDWARDS ET AL., TECHNICAL ANALYSIS
OF STOCK TRENDS 348 (9th ed. 2007). While volatility attracts investors who are
willing to take risky market positions for a greater payout, in a volatile market,
supplies "stand a good chance of being disrupted and unstable." JAKE
BERNSTEIN, NEW FACTS ON FUTURES 3 (1992). Since the futures market was
originally created in order to "protect the farmer from volatile prices moves" and
keep supplies from becoming unstable, a volatile market no longer serves its
purpose of "stabiliz[ing] prices" in the economy. Id.
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alike ECM contract. '271 There are many forms of market
manipulation and, at times, the term itself may be difficult
to define. 272 However, for purposes here, price or market
manipulation may be seen as a practice "calculated to cause
or maintain a price at a level artificially high or low-a'273
price not reflective of supply and demand conditions.
The type of manipulation which is more specifically the
concern of this discussion is that which was examined in
the D.C. Conference-that is, manipulation which results
from allowing an ECM to use DCM's settlement prices for
its own look-alike contracts. Generating artificial values
through the placing of large orders on futures contract
settlement prices which are linked to OTCs has been
referred to as "micromanipulation. 274
This type of manipulation may be illustrated through
the actions of hedge fund, Amaranth Advisors, during
February and April of 2006. Amaranth's scheme involved
an attempt to manipulate the price of natural gas futures
on ICE and NYMEX. 275 Amaranth held large short
positions 276 on natural gas swaps on ICE and long
27
positions 277 on natural gas futures contracts on NYMEX. 8
271. See HEARING, supra note 7, at 34-35. Furthermore, "[f]or both markets
the same types of traders are active participants." Id. at 35.
272. See generally KOLB & OVERDAHL, supranote 5, at 56.
273. Markham, supra note 255, § 14:3. For example, "one purpose of price
manipulation by floor brokers may be to distort prices just enough to trigger
customers' protective stop order which the floor brokers know to be in hand;
once the stop order price is touched, the stop orders become market orders that
must be filled." Id.; see also 1 SECURITIES TRAINING CORPORATION, SERIES SEVEN
31 (2005) (defining manipulation as "[t]he illegal practice of buying or selling a
security for the purpose of creating a false or misleading appearance of active
trading or for the purpose of raising or depressing the price to induce the
purchase or sale by others").
274. KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 5, at 85 ("A micromanipulation results
from a momentary rigging of a futures contract's settlement price ... [a] trader
may find it profitable to conduct this type of manipulation if they have an OTC
derivatives position that is valued using the futures price as a reference price.").
275. See U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Amaranth Advisors,
554 F. Supp. 2d 523, 527-28, 533 (2008).
276. A "short position" is the position of the party selling the commodity,
which is "the party obligated to deliver the commodity on the delivery date." Id.
at 526.
277. A 'long position" is the position held by the buyer who is "obligated to
accept delivery of the commodity." Id.
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Amaranth planned on selling a large amount of long
positions during the final 30 minutes of the expiration date
on NYMEX-a practice known as "marking the close"which would consequently drive down the settlement prices
for the months of certain NYMEX contracts. 279 Since ICE
relied on NYMEX's settlement prices for its OTCs, a
successful attempt to manipulate the settlement prices on
NYMEX would consequently make Amaranth's short
positions on ICE profitable. 28 0 Moreover, due to the fact
that ICE was an unregulated ECM, the CFTC was unable
to "prevent price distortions and excessive speculation"
281
caused by Amaranth's positions on ICE at the time.
Ultimately, Amaranth was unsuccessful in its scheme as a
result of its broker's failure in executing the entire order in
time.28 2 The hedge fund was charged with attempted
market manipulation and has since dissolved. 28 3 Although
Amaranth was caught for its manipulative endeavors, those
who have gotten away with similar behavior to the
28 4
detriment of the economy have yet to be named.
Nevertheless, if copyright protection were implemented to
keep such prices from ICE's grasp-an issue which will be

278. Id. at 527.
279. Hill, supra note 257, at 1186.
280. See id. ('The move was an attempt to ensure that its selling drove
down the price of natural gas contracts, thereby again makings its shorts on
ICE profitable."); Lynn Garner, CFTC Enforcement Court Rebuffs Bid by
Amaranth Fund to Dismiss Natural Gas Trading Case, 40 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 870 (June 2, 2008) ("The defendants... were trying to take advantage of
the fact that the settlement price of ICE swaps was based on NYMEX natural
gas futures settlement price determined on the last day of trading for the
monthly contracts. In essence, the defendants intended to push down the price
of the NYMEX natural gas futures contracts to benefit their larger financial
swap positions on ICE, which is an unregulated electronic trading platform, the
complaint alleged.").
281. Lynn Garner, Sen. Levin Introduces Bill to Regulate Exempt Markets,
Close 'EnronLoophole', 39 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1466 (Sept. 24, 2007); Hill,
supranote 257, at 1186.
282. See Hill, supra note 257, at 1186.
283. See id.
284. Garner, supra note 3, at 946 (quoting Sen. Maria Cantwell as claiming
that, "It's time for ICE to name names... [t]he CFTC has the legal authority to
find out who these large traders are and whether as few as three to four
organizations are driving the market").
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addressed in more detail later 285-traders
such as
Amaranth would not have the ability to manipulate the
markets in this manner.
1. Modifications to the Regulatory Structure. As a result
of the Amaranth situation-in correlation with the
consistently rising prices of oil and natural gas in the
United States over the past two years-Congress began to
blame manipulation and excessive speculation in the
28 6
market as the reason for the rise in high energy prices.
Ongoing pressure has been placed on the CFTC to modify
the disparity in regulation between the markets, in order to
more thoroughly monitor the actions of those who trade
between ECMs and DCMs. 28 7 Consequently, while our
economy was faced with "'volatile markets and high energy
prices,"' 288 there have been recent oversight initiatives
which will most likely cause positions
on ICE to become
more transparent in the near future. 28 9
On May 22, 2008, the Farm Bill (H.R. 2419) was
enacted into law which included CFTC reauthorization
provisions. 290 Such provisions enabled the CFTC to extend
"principles-based
oversight
to
exempt
[U.S.-based]
commercial markets that trade contracts with 'significant'
price discovery roles. ' 291 As a result of the bill, ICE's
natural gas swaps are now fully regulated. 292 Yet, ICE
Futures Europe-upon which the Henry Hub crude oil look-

285. See infra Part V.B.2.
286. Garner, supra note 256, at 910.
287. See Garner, supra note 248, at 1754.
288. Richard Hill, Durbin, Citing Oil Prices, Offers Bill To Boost CFTC
Powers;June 17 Hearing Set, 40 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 947 (June 16, 2008)
(quoting Sen. Tom Harkin, Sen. Agriculture Committee Chairman) [hereinafter
Hill, Durbin]; see also Richard Hill, OTC ICE Market Heeding CFTC Calls to
Cooperate on Data-Sharing,39 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 192 (Feb. 5, 2007).
289. Richard Hill, Reid Anti-Speculation Bill Takes Aim at 'Look-Alike'
Energy Trades, 40 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1136 (July 21, 2008).
290. H.R. Con. Res. 2419, 110th Cong. (2008) (enacted).
291. Hill, supra note 258, at 806; see also MARK JICKLING, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., LIBRARY OF CONG., REP. No. RS22028, CFTC REAUTHORIZATION (2008),

availableat http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RS22028.pdf.
292. See Diana B. Henriques, Sunlight on a 'Dark Market,' N.Y. TIMES, July
25, 2008, at C1 (explaining that the farm bill allows for "ICE's over-the-counter
natural gas swaps [to be] as fully regulated as if they were traded on Nymex").
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alike contracts trade-was still able to "escape[ ]CFTC
oversight" on the basis that it deferred to the United
Kingdom's Financial Service Authority. 293 To address this
problem, on June 12, 2008, Senators Maria Cantwell and
Olympia Snowe introduced a bill to increase the authority
of the farm bill by "forc[ing] ICE to register as a designated
contract market. ' 294 Specifically addressing such look-alike
contracts such as West Texas Intermediate crude oil which
rely on NYMEX settlement prices, the bill is intended to
provide regulatory oversight to the foreign exchange in
order to impose "position limits to prevent excessive
speculation" and supplement regulations which are not
"robust enough to prevent manipulation in American oil
markets. ' 295 Five days later, the CFTC made an
announcement to amend the no-action letter it provided
ICE in 2006 in the hopes that the London futures market
will
"adopt
U.S.-equivalent
position
limits
and
accountability levels on its West Texas Intermediary crude
oil contract. ' 296 While this would increase market
transparency, 297 the United Kingdom's Financial Services
Authority has yet '29
to review the agreement and could
"overrule the deal. 8 Finally, on July 15, 2008, a bill
entitled the "Stop Excessive Energy Speculation Act" would
monitor and regulate investors who trade "U.S. 'look-alike'
energy contracts on foreign exchanges. ' 299 If these bills
pass-and they most likely will receive a great deal of
support considering that, as of September 11, 2008, studies
concluded that market speculation was the cause of rising
oil prices 3 00 -ICE will be on the same footing as NYMEX in
terms of operating in a transparent market. However, at

293. Garner, supra note 3, at 946.
294. Id.
295. Hill, supra note 258, at 806.
296. Hill, supra note 266, at 983.
297. Id.
298. Richard Hill, U.K.'s FSA Still Can Reject No-Action Condition CFTC
Put on London ICE, 40 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1191 (July 28, 2008).

299. Richard Hill, Futures TradingReid Anti-Speculation Bill Takes Aim at
'Look-Alike'Energy Trades, 40 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1136 (June 21, 2008).

300. See H. Josef Hebert, Speculators Get the Blame for Oil Price Spike,
A8.

BUFFALO NEWS, Sept. 11, 2008, at
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the present time, this sort of fluid transparency has yet to
be seen.
2. Impact on the Economy and the Copyright Solution.
The Amaranth scheme precisely illustrates the problems
which exist on account of ICE's use of NYMEX's settlement
prices. Due to excessive price manipulation in both the
natural gas and oil markets, the public has seen "how the
futures prices affect the physical prices." 301 While more
oversight has been provided to ECMs, the oil futures traded
on ICE Futures Europe still provide a playing field for nontransparent trading. 30 2 This has left-and will continue to
leave open-the possibility for experienced, unethical
traders who are familiar with the regulations to trade on
both exchanges to the detriment of the economy. To make
matters worse, those banks which "lost billions of dollars in
the sub-prime mortgage debacle" decided to focus their
attention more closely on energy trading. 303 The
consequences of such unmonitored, abusive trading have
"creat[ed] a consumer crisis for average citizens." 30 4
Quite simply, manipulation of the Henry Hub
commodity has affected those parts of the economy which
rely on natural gas. 305 Those harmed include the
manufacturing sector in the United States, 306 as well as
anyone who purchases-and relies on the use of-natural
gas. 30 7 It has been noted that natural gas prices for the
301. Garner, supra note 256, at 910.
302. See Hill, supra note 266, at 983.
303. JUHASZ, supra note 249, at 161-62.
304. Hill, supra note 299, at 1136.
305. HEARING, supra note 7, at 162. (explaining that "price volatility in the
U.S. market for natural gas is due to a failure of the current regulatory
structure for the trading of futures on natural gas").
306. Id. at 159 ("Unfortunately, price volatility in the market for natural gas
in the United States has made the U.S. [s]ignificantly less competitive for
manufacturing operations that rely on natural gas as a commodity which has
and . . . will continue to have[,] a significant impact on employment in the
manufacturing sector of this country's economy.").
307. See id. at 176-77 ("Natural gas is the lifeblood of our economy, and
millions of consumers depend on natural gas every day to meet their daily
needs. It is critical that the prices those consumers are paying for natural gas
comes out through the operation of a fair, orderly and transparent
marketplace."); see also Statement of Sen. Levin, supra note 248, at 2
(discussing how abuse on ICE and NYMEX affects the price of natural gas
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winter of 2006 were "clearly out of whack" on account of
"price distortions" sparked by the inability to monitor abuse
on unregulated markets such as ICE. 308 To further draw the
link between the markets and the impact of manipulation
on the economy, it was explained that when "the positions
accumulated by Amaranth began to unwind, gas prices
decreased. ' 309 In 2007, it was reported by the Municipal
Gas Authority of Georgia that "Amaranth's excesses
increased the cost of its winter gas purchases by $18
million. ' 310 Concisely stated, "'Amaranth's massive trades
turned the natural gas market into a giant electronic
casino.' 311 While the price of natural gas has since dropped
as of July 2008, by early August, the price was still eleven
percent higher than it was during the winter of 2007.312
The manipulation of West Texas crude oil futures may
have been even more rampant-and more harmful to the
economy-than that of the natural gas contracts. Upon its
creation, ICE was intended to serve as a "trading platform
for crude oil. '3 13 Deregulation created a great opportunity
for the "price manipulation of crude oil" and it is found that
"[t]oday the price of a barrel of oil is largely determined by

which "heats the majority of American homes" and "powers 20% of our electrical
plants").
308. Statement of Sen. Levin, supra note 248, at 3. Senator Levin discusses
how Amaranth, a hedge fund, used this discrepancy in regulation in order to
dominate the natural gas market in the spring and summer of 2006. When
Amaranth's positions on NYMEX's market became too large, the CFTC
compelled NYMEX to direct Amaranth to reduce the size of such positions.
Instead of reducing its size, Amaranth merely switched its extensive positions
to ICE's Henry Hub OTCs-that is, beyond the reach of the CFTC's control. Id.
As a result, the Municipal Gas Authority of Georgia complained that
Amaranth's behavior alone "increased the cost of their winter gas purchases by
$18 million." Id.
309. HEARING, supranote 7, at 173.
310. Garner, supra note 281, at 1466.
311. Id. (quoting Sen. Levin).
312. Jad Mouawad, Baby, It's Going to Be Cold Inside, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6,
2008, at C1 (projecting that the heating bills for the winter of 2008 will "far
exceed" those of last year).
313. JuHASZ, supranote 249, at 149.
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the actions of energy futures traders. ' 314 Between 2000 and
2006, the amount of crude oil contracts traded on ICE
increased by 322 percent, which subsequently increased by
an additional "140 percent from 2005 and 2006 alone." 315 By
2006, nearly 80 percent of all contracts traded on ICE were
for crude oil.316 Furthermore, in early June of 2008,
NYMEX controlled 75 percent of the open interests of these
futures contracts while ICE maintained the remaining 25
percent of the market share. 317
The "deregulation of energy trading" is the "most
overlooked factor driving the meteoric rise in oil prices
today." 318 More "trades are now taking place off the
regulated exchanges altogether, either at the ICE or as
unregulated swaps between major traders. '319 Senator
Richard Durbin explains that there is currently "very little
visibility" for over-the-counter trades such as "those that
take place on the IntercontinentalExchange in London. ' 320
The West Texas Crude oil look-alike contracts provided by
ICE "can encroach on price discovery." 321 As a result,
allowing ICE to trade these contracts outside of CFTC
oversight opens the doors for hedge funds to "purposely
driv[e] up prices on a foreign exchange [in order] to
influence the price of futures contracts traded in the
USA. '' 322 Consequently, the trading of the West Texas
contract on ICE is blamed for the rise in oil futures
prices. 323

314. Id. at 127. In addition, "[diata compiled by the CFTC demonstrates
that from approximately 2000 to 2006, the amount of energy trading due to
speculation nearly tripled. All of which opens the door to manipulation." Id. at
158.
315. Id. at 156.
316. Id. at 149.
317. Hill, supra note 254, at 868.
318. JUHASZ, supra note 249, at 127.
319. Id. at 158.
320. Hill, Durbin,supra note 288, at 947.
321. Hill, supranote 266, at 983.
322. Adam Shell, Are Big Bets By Speculators Driving Up Oil?, USA TODAY,
July 1, 2008, at lB.
323. Hill, supra note 298, at 1191.
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Since January 2008 to mid-June, "oil prices have
climbed about 40 percent" and "prices at the pump are
directly linked" to oil prices. 324 Specifically, oil prices are
"undoubtedly the largest factor determining the prices of
gasoline," while lesser influences include "costs and profits
associated with refining oil into gasoline, transporting and
marketing it, and taxes. ' 325 Although gas prices
"immediately shoot up with an increase in the price of
crude," such prices may be slow in declining after the price
of crude decreases. 326 Oil prices hit their peak in early July,
at which point the price of oil was $147.27 a barrel during
mid-day trading, finally settling at $145.08.327 At about the
same time, it was recorded that oil futures skyrocketed to
$10.75 a barrel, which was the "largest single-day increase
in history. ' 328 Only during the energy crisis of 1973 and
1979-both periods when market manipulation in crude oil
prices peaked this rapidly. 329
ran rampant-have
Consequently, such manipulation not only affects the
airline industry, gasoline retailers, 330 and automobile
companies, 331 but it also is a concern to the wide spectrum

324. Press Release, Jeff Bingaman, Senator, CFTC Answers Raise More
Questions (June 17, 2008), 2008 WLNR 11422361 (indicating that "prices at the
pump are directly linked to the price or [sic] oil."); see also JUHASZ, supra note
249, at 169 ("The rising price of crude oil has helped push gasoline prices in the
United States to the highest levels in modern history.").
325. JUHASZ, supra note 249, at 174.
326. Id. at 175.
327. See Craig Karmin, Anxiety, $145 Oil Make for Another Red Week for
Stocks, WALL ST. J., July 12-13, 2008, at Bi; Nelson D. Schwartz, Asleep at the
Spigot: A Thirst for Oil Comes Back to Haunt a Nation of Gas Guzzlers, N.Y.
TIMES, July 6, 2008, at B1.
328. Jad Mouawad & Diana B. Henriques, Why is Oil So High? Pick a View,
N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2008, at Cl.
329. JUHASZ, supranote 249, at 128.
330. See Elizabeth Williamson, Airline Oil Lobbying Alarms Financial
Firms, WALL ST. J., July 12-13, 2008, at A3 ("Strapped by rising fuel prices, the
airline industry, gasoline retailers and an array of transportation interests are
enlisting thousands of travelers to pressure Congress to reign in oil markets
speculation.").
331. See Matthew Dolan & Jeff Bennett, Ford Suffers Record Loss as Oil
Shock Hits Industry, WALL ST. J., July 25, 2008, at Al, All (explaining that
"[iln a fresh sign of the turmoil wrought upon the auto industry by high fuel
prices and cratering demand for trucks, Ford Motor Co.reported an $8.7 billion
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of U.S. citizens who rely on gasoline. 32 Overall, it has been
estimated that the "speculative bubble in the oil market has
cost the economy over a half trillion dollars over the past
two years. '3 33
The cause-and implicit solution to-these issues was
concisely illustrated by Commissioner Bart Chilton during
the 2007 Public Hearingon Exempt Commercial Markets:
We're supposed to protect price discovery, we're supposed to guard
against manipulation, fraud and abuse, and we're supposed to try
to ensure that these markets for futures and options operate in a
way that's viable, effective, and efficient not only for hedgers and
speculators but for consumers . . .[a]nd it makes it really difficult

for us to achieve those goals when we have these look-alike energy
markets that are operating in the dark which aren't subject to the
33 4
rules and regulations of the Commission.

Chilton's pleas have been heard. ICE's natural gas
swaps are now regulated and high-profile individuals have
taken steps in addressing issues regarding ICE oil futures
while bills calling for more market transparency have been
presented to Congress. 335 Yet, there is still "very little
for the second quarter" and that "[bloth Ford and GM have been slammed by
rising gasoline prices.").
332. Stephen Power, Sara Murray, & Siobhan Hughes, Energy is Top
Economic Issue for Voters, WALL ST. J., July 25, 2008, at A3 (explaining that

"gasoline and utility costs" rank "as the economic issue that voters say affects
them the most personally").
333. Garner, supra note 256, at 910.
334. HEARING, supra note 7, at 14-15 (testimony of Comm'r Bart Chilton).

335. See e.g., John Dunbar, Obama Plans to Close 'Enron Loophole,'

BUFFALO NEWS, June 23, 2008, at A5 ("Sen. Barack Obama on Sunday said as
president he would strengthen government oversight of energy traders he
blames in large part for the skyrocketing price of oil."); Letter from Coalition to
Congress, (June 11, 2008) ("Urging Congress to Take Serious Steps to Address
the Distorted Energy Commodity Markets;" "[a]bsent an immediate reform in
the widely-speculative energy commodity futures markets, oil prices worldwide
will continue to surge, clamping down even harder on the U.S. economy."),
available at http://www.airlines.org/NR/rdonlyres/B1484BF4-F199-4C7F-98FD843F9FE95BD8/0/CoalitionFuelLettertoCongressonShortTermSolutionsO8O611.
pdf; see also CFTC Improvement Act of 2008, H.R. 5768, 110th Cong. (2008)
(amending the CEA to revise the CFTC to cover foreign exchange dealers);
Close the London Loophole Act of 2008, S.3129, 110th Cong. (2008) (amending
the CEA to "prevent price manipulation and excessive speculation" resulting
from foreign exchanges); Increasing Transparency and Accountability in Oil
Prices Act of 2008, S. 3130, 110th Cong. (2008) (providing "greater resources
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visibility" for trades which take place outside of the United
States-such as that of ICE's West Texas intermediate
crude oil futures contract. 336 In addition, even those bills
which offer solutions through the furtherance of universal
market transparency have been criticized by the Futures
Industry Association as a form of "regulatory overkill" that
could ultimately 'drive energy market activity overseas
and hopelessly complicate the regulatory mission of the
[CFTC]."'337 This reveals that, while transparency may be a
solution, it may not necessarily be the best solution.
On the other hand, if the NYME court took into account
how the public as a whole could potentially be affected by
volatile energy costs on account of applying the merger
doctrine to-and thus, refusing to grant copyright
protection for-NYMEX's settlement prices, the court may
have decided differently. Granting protection to the
settlement prices would have served as an immediate
action to hinder the excessive speculation or manipulation
that took place between the Henry Hub and West Texas
Intermediate contracts and OTCs. If ICE were forced to
generate its own settlement prices, dishonest traders would
have no reason to influence the NYMEX values in order to
manipulate the prices upon which ICE relies. Furthermore,
the excessive speculation between linked contracts-which
sent the cost of energy products skyrocketing-could have
style"
"Amaranth
Consequently,
been
avoided.
manipulation or speculation would cease to exist on the
linked NYMEX and ICE instruments. Although this would
not have solved all of the disparity that existed between
linked ECM and DCM markets, abuse between the ICE and
NYMEX energy markets could have been avoided. After all,
it was found that when "early ECM contracts were
generally, not directly, linked to regulated futures

and authority" for the CFTC); H.R. 6130, 110th Cong. (2008) (providing for "a
study of the effects of speculation in the futures markets for natural gas, crude
oil, and gasoline"); Commodity Speculation Reform Act of 2008, S. 3248, 110th
Cong. (2008) (amending the CEA to "clarify the treatment of purchases of
certain commodity futures contracts and financial instruments with respect to
limits established by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission relating to
excessive speculation, and for other purposes").
336. Hill, Durbin,supra note 288, at 947.
337. Hill,
Association).

supra note

299,

at

1136

(quoting

the

Futures Industry
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markets," they "did not affect the Commission's
oversight." 338
In the future, taking the public interest into account
prior to applying the merger doctrine could serve as a
means of avoiding the harms suffered by those affected by
an out of control economy. In other words, the court should
have considered how the general population, outside of the
two disputing parties, would have been affected by its
decision. When courts merely consider the incentives
needed for the private party to create, they largely overlook
the broader picture of the citizens to whom they should
protect. Shortly after the Second Circuit's decision in this
case-during the first half of 2008--oil prices "surged"
while the CFTC "had its head in the sand."339
Consequently, copyright protection could have served as a
quick and easy alternative to the long, drawn out attempts
of Congress to compel the CFTC to hash out a solution.
Therefore, due to the powerful nature of the merger
doctrine, broader economic policy measures should be
considered before it is applied.
C. TradingInstruments and Competition
A more glaring problem with allowing ICE to use
NYMEX's settlement prices is that failing to provide
protection to such values deadens the incentive to generate
new commodities amongst the exchanges. Granting an
exchange the right to exclusively trade its own unique
futures contracts and rely on its own settlement prices will
not generate the sort of anticompetitive monopoly that
copyright is leery of endorsing. Rather, futures markets are
unique in the sense that the trading of a contract on a
single exchange-that is, "centralized trading"-is "not
necessarily" perceived as non-competitive. 340 This type of
trading is efficient in the sense that "it reduces the
economy-wide costs of producing the service" which
"lower[s] trading costs to everyone by increasing liquidity
and reducing so-called transaction costs." 341 Competition
338. HEARING, supra note 7, at 33.
339. Hebert, supra note 300, at A8.
340. KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 5, at 55.
341. Id.
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throughout futures markets may therefore be sparked
through "innovation in the design of the contracts" offered
by an exchange and by granting an exchange the "exclusive
right to trade particular contracts" in order to benefit from
its creation. 342 Specifically, "one of the most fertile areas of
exchange competition" is through the innovation of contract
design. 343 Consequently, there is nothing wrong with being
the dominant exchange for trading a product as long as the
through open competition under the
position is achieved
3 44
antitrust laws.

Although the creation of new contracts certainly
provides for a healthy competitive market, using another
exchange's settlement price data swings the competition
345
pendulum into a state of degenerative free-riding.
Property rights in settlement prices or quotes are a "central
function of financial exchanges" 346 and it is well recognized
that "price discovery is expensive. ' 347 The rights that

342. Id.
343. Id.; see also Bd. of Trade v. Dow Jones & Co., 456 N.E.2d 84, 89
(explaining that, in the context of using indexes for settlement prices on futures
contracts, enforcing protection for such indexes "may stimulate the creation of
new indexes perhaps better suited to the purpose of 'hedging' against the
'systematic' risk present in the stock market"); Jerry W. Markham, The
Commodity Exchange Monopoly-Reform is Needed, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
977, 1003 (1991) (explaining that "competition could assure that the
[commodity] exchanges remain innovative by creating new, more attractive
futures contracts and that their marketplaces remain free of fraud .... "). For
example, in 2004 the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) generated an "additional"
gold futures contract which was specifically "designed to compete with the [New
York Mercantile] Exchange's gold futures contract." HOLDINGS, supra note 6, at
9. Once this commodity surfaced in the market, NYMEX conceded that this
certainly did "represent a source of competition." Id.
344. See KOLB & OVERDAHL, supranote 5, at 55.

345. Ali Sartipzadeh, Jurisdiction and Procedure: ICE's' Counterclaims
Against NYMEX Dismissed; CFTC Should Decide Matter, 36 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 1400 (2004) (explaining that "NYMEX has a legitimate business
interest in preventing its competitor, ICE, from free-riding on NYMEX's
settlement prices . . . a legitimate interest in preventing rivals from free-riding
on this reputation").
346. J. Harold Mulherin et al., Prices are Property: The Organization of
FinancialExchanges from a Transaction Cost Perspective, 34 J. L. & ECON. 591,
592 (1991).
347. LEE, supra note 31, at 261; see also J. Harold Mulherin et al., supra
note 346, at 593 ("price discovery entails substantial costs; hence, we should not
expect exchanges to be loosely run organizations that arise as if by magic").
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NYMEX has in such prices have been implicitly recognized
for years-for Congress and the CFTC have permitted
"NYMEX to provide early access to its Settlement Prices in
exchange for license fees. '' 348 Furthermore, allowing an
ECM to use a DCM's settlement prices for a similar
instrument decreases the incentives to generate new,
unique financial products. 349 While an OTC swap is a
different financial instrument from a futures contract,
when it uses the exact settlement prices for the same
contract, the two are virtually indistinguishable.
Finally, the inevitable question that therefore
materializes is what motivation would one have in the
generating of settlement prices if a competitor merely
copies these prices for his own advantage? As noted by
scholar, Richard Posner, "a firm is less likely to expend
resources on developing a new product if competing firms
that have not borne the expense of development can
duplicate the product." 350 The free-riding behavior of ICE
not only provides traders with the ability to manipulate the
market, but this practice similarly harms the incentives for
DCMs such as NYMEX who are required to generate these
prices.
Consequently,
greater
intellectual
property
protection should be considered for prices that are
generated and subsequently used by different exchanges for
linked contracts. Again, if copyright protection were
granted for such prices, DCMs could largely preserve and
protect those incentives necessary for settlement price
creation.
VI. THE MISAPPROPRIATION ALTERNATIVE

A. Misappropriationand FinancialExchanges
There may have been an alternative form of Intellectual
Property protection-other than copyright-which could
have protected the settlement prices due to their time-

348. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 50, at 26; see also LEE, supra
note 31, at 103-04 (Sales of NYMEX's exchange information accounted for 30%
of NYMEX's total income in 1996.).
349. KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 5, at 55.
350. See LANDES &

POSNER,

supra note 195, at 13.
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sensitive nature. NYMEX's settlement prices are only
valuable to the exchange for the short period of time after
they are created and before they are reported publicly.
During this period, NYMEX distributes prices to those with
whom it has entered into a licensing agreement. In fact, by
the time the prices are reported before the next day of
trading-when they grace the pages of the Wall Street
Journal nationwide-they are fair game to everyone and of
no value to the exchange. For this reason, NYMEX's
contention stems from ICE's use of NYMEX's prices before
settlement prices are publicly reported. 351 A limited form of
protection could, therefore, suitably protect the intellectual
property rights sought by NYMEX for its settlement prices.
While copyright law would serve as a reliable form of
protection, 352 and Justice Holmes granted protection to the
Chicago Board of Trades' quotations in 1905 on the basis of
a quasi "trade secret," 353 one other option that NYMEX may
have at its disposal is the state-law action of
misappropriation. Misappropriation claims may in fact be
the best form of protection for the limitedly valuable prices,
for the claim prevents unfair competition by offering
"protection
of property
rights
in
time-sensitive
354
information."
On the premise of unfair competition, the Unites States
Supreme Court established the tort of misappropriation in
the landmark case of International News Services v.
Associated Press.355 The case dealt with two companies who
competed in gathering and distributing news to various
newspaper subscribers. 356 International News Services
351. See Reply Brief of the Petitioner, supra note 225, at 1.
352. See Peter K. Trzyna, Legal Protections for Innovative Financial
Products and Services, in FINANCIAL ENGINEERING: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO
FINANCIAL INNOVATION 687, 703 (John F. Marshall & Vipul K. Bansal eds., 1992)
("In some situations, this species of unfair competition law may be the only
possibility for protecting a financial product. However, other forms of
intellectual property protection may be more efficient and ultimately more
reliable.").
353. KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 5, at 100 (quoting Bd. of Trade v.
Christie Grain and Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236 (1905)).
354. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 853 (2d Cir.
1997).
355. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
356. See id. at 229-30.

338

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

(INS) intercepted the news collected by the Associated
Press (AP) and provided such information to its own clients
for a fee.3 57 Current events are "common property" and the
AP could not establish a copyright claim in the news itself
since INS merely took the basic news idea rather than the
verbatim expression used by AP in the conveyance of this
material. 358 However, the Court held that INS's
appropriation-taking newsworthy material gathered by
AP and distributing it to its own clients-was a type of
unfair competition in the form of misappropriation. 359 Years
later, the House of Representatives revisited the
misappropriation issue and seemed to indicate that it could
apply precisely to the type of financial material at issue in
NYME:
For example, state law should have the flexibility to afford a
remedy . . . against a consistent pattern of unauthorized
appropriation by a competitor of the facts (i.e., not the literary
expression) constituting "hot" news, whether in the traditional
mold of International News Service . . . or in the newer form
of
3 60
data updates from scientific, business, or financial data bases.

Similarly, the data updates of NYMEX's settlement
prices-the "newer form" of "hot" news-is precisely the
material that the exchange would be seeking to protect. The
Second Circuit almost implicitly alludes to this type of
protection by stating
that NYMEX "treats the prices as
'36 1
news of the day."
In fact, shortly after such legislation, courts applied
misappropriation claims to the unlawful acts of financial
exchanges' use of stock market indexes for futures

357. See id. at 230.
358. See id. at 235.
359. See id.; 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 10:48 (4th ed. 2008) (explaining that the court
understood that AP did not have a monopoly to hot news as "against the public
at large" but a 'quasi-property right' to the law of trusts: 'that he who has fairly
paid the price should have the beneficial use of the property"' (citation
omitted)).
360. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d at 850 (quoting H.R.
REP. No. 94-1476, at 132 (1976)).
361. N. Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. IntercontinentalExch., Inc., 497 F.3d
109, 115 n.6 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1669 (2008).
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contracts. For example, Standard & Poor's Co. v.
Commodity Exchange, Inc. 362 dealt with a futures
exchange-Comex-which generated a "Comex 500 Stock
Index" contract which relied on the numerical value of the
Standard & Poor 500 Index for its settlement price. 363 One
pertinent issue concerned whether Standard & Poor (S&P)
could
enforce
an
unfair
competition
claim
of
misappropriation against Comex for marketing a futures
contract which relied on their index for its settlement
price. 364 In assessing the harm to S&P, the Second Circuit
found that "Comex' proposed use is no different than INS'
condemned conduct in InternationalNews Service: Comex is
taking S&P's Index, on which S&P expends substantial
money, labor and expertise." 36 5 Comex subsequently used
this information to compete directly with other financial
exchanges that lawfully used the S&P 500 Index for their
futures contracts-such as the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange. 366 While the Second Circuit merely affirmed a
preliminary injunction without addressing the merits of the
case, the court concluded that "at a minimum S&P's claim
of misappropriation presents sufficiently serious questions
going to the merits to make them a fair ground for
litigation. '36 7 Also, akin to that of the dispute addressed in
NYME, Judge Newman speculated that:
[Wihen Standard & Poor's makes its stock index known to the

public, different, novel . . . close questions are presented when
another company enters a business other than the publishing of
stock indices-here, the marketing of futures contracts-and in its
business uses the Standard & Poor's index368
as a reference pointhere, the settlement price for the contracts.

362. 683 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1982).
363. Id. at 706.
364. See generally id. at 710-12.
365. Id. at 711.
366. See id.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 712 (Newman, J., concurring). But see Dow Jones & Co. v. Int'l
Sec. Exch., Inc., 451 F.3d 295, 306 (2d Cir. 2006) (distinguishing Comex on the
grounds that it dealt with the defendant's copying of a number generated by the
plaintiff for a financial instrument rather than an attempt to receive rights in a
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Board of Trade v. Dow Jones & Co. touched upon a

similar issue. 369 In this case, the court concluded that the
Board of Trade of the city of Chicago's use of the Dow Jones
index and industrial average for their own futures contract
constituted "commercial misappropriation" of the Dow
Jones index and averages. 3 70 Relying on a policy argument
similar to that used by the NYME court in assessing merger
doctrine application, Dow Jones argued that "if its rights in
the averages are not protected, there will be a diminished
incentive for it to continue to provide the averages. ' 371 The
Supreme Court of Illinois weighed the possibilities of
allowing Dow Jones to "profit from [its] effort" against the
fear of providing the company with a monopoly in its stock
index. 372 Consequently, the court affirmed that Dow Jones
should be entitled to protection from the Board of Trade's
misappropriation, reasoning that any harm which will
result from this determination will be "outweighed by the
new indexes
to develop
resultant encouragement
of
hedging
against the
designed
for
the
purpose
specifically
'systematic' risk present in the stock market. ' 373 Therefore,
not only did the court affirm the misappropriation
application, but it appears as if the court also felt that the
enforcement of this claim would encourage competition
rather than hinder it.

B. The PreemptionIssue
Since misappropriation is enforced under state law, and
copyright is federally governed, one hurdle that NYMEX
faces here is that of copyright preemption.3 74 Copyright
preemption is the theory that materials which "come within
the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102
"basket of securities" which were sold on the secondary market-a right which

plaintiffs were unable to protect).
369. 456 N.E.2d 84 (Ill.
1983).
370. Id. at 87.
371. Id. at 88.
372. Id. at 89.
373. Id. at 90.
374. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2006) ("Preemption with
respect to other laws"); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 359, § 10:51 ('The extent
to which the state misappropriation doctrine can 'fill in the gaps' in federal
copyright law is the subject of federal preemption analysis.").
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and 103" may not seek protection under state law.3 75
Although copyright and misappropriation "sometimes
overlap,"3 76 copyright law protects creativity while
misappropriation protects the "sweat of the brow" effort
which Feist explained would never be protected by
copyright. 377 The preemption hurdle ensures that persons
who fail on a copyright claim do not immediately pursue the
route of misappropriation to keep a competitor from
utilizing such property. To allow such practices would
generate something similar to that of a "mutant copyright
law" which Justice Scalia warned of in Dastar Corp. v.
378
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.
Due to the fact that the 1976 Copyright Act does not
explain when misappropriation is preempted by federal
law, courts have developed their own bright-line standards
in addressing this issue. 379 The Second Circuit decided in
National Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc. that "only a
narrow
'hot-news'
misappropriation
claim survives
preemption for actions concerning material within the
realm of copyright." 38 0 The court found that in order to
establish a state misappropriation claim in "hot-news," the
following factors must be met:
(i) the plaintiff generates or collects information at some cost or
expense . . . (ii) the value of the information is highly timesensitive... (iii) the defendant's use of the information constitutes
free-riding on the plaintiffs costly efforts to generate or collect it..
• (iv) the defendant's use of the information is in direct competition
with a product or service offered by the plaintiff ... (v) the ability
of other parties to free-ride on the efforts of the plaintiff would so

375. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (explaining that all of the material within the scope of
sections 106, 102, and 103 of the Copyright Act are "governed exclusively" by
the laws of copyright).
376. MCCARTHY, supra note 359, § 10:47.
377. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 354 (1991).
378. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34
(2003).
379. See INDEXING FOR MAXIMUM INVESTMENT RESULTS, supra note 4, at 355
(explaining that "the 1976 Copyright Act contains broad language that does not
explicitly explain when misappropriation protections should be exempted from
federal preemption").
380. 105 F.3d 841, 852 (2d Cir. 1997).
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that its
reduce the incentive to produce the product or service
38 1
existence or quality would be substantially threatened.

Also, material which may otherwise be protected under
copyright will survive preemption if the "extra element" test
is met. 38 2 In other words, as indicated by the Second
Circuit, the second, third, and fifth prongs of the test listed
above are the "extra elements" which are essential 3in
83
establishing a hot news misappropriation claim.
Consequently, if NYMEX were able to establish that all of
the prongs listed above were satisfied in regard to its
relationship with ICE, then NYMEX's claim would not be
preempted and a misappropriation claim would be
successful.
The first four "hot news" conditions could probably be
satisfied with ease. As for the first condition, it is clear that
NYMEX "generates or collects information at some cost or
expense." NYMEX has a Settlement Price Committee solely
dedicated to the task of "determining the settlement price of
each open futures contract for each commodity" on a daily
basis. 38 4 As previously discussed, it is generally accepted
that price discovery is costly. 38 5 Secondly, the value of the
information is certainly time-sensitive. A settlement price is
created daily and only valuable to NYMEX during the
period when they are able to sell such material to various
venders through licensing agreements. 386 As for the third
prong, "free riding" on the plaintiffs efforts (an
"indispensable element"), it is clear that ICE does not have
to "expend their own resources" or "bear[ ] their own costs"

381. Id.
382. Id. at 850 (quoting Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d
693, 716 (2d Cir. 1992)).
383. Id. at 853.
384. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. IntercontinentalExch., Inc., 497 F.3d
109, 111 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1669 (2008).
385. See Mulherin et al., supra note 346, at 593.
386. See N.Y Mercantile Exch., Inc., 497 F.3d at 112 (explaining that
"between the time of creating the prices and the required public disclosure the
following day, NYMEX supplies them to market data vendors such as Reuters
pursuant to license agreements").
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in retrieving settlement price values. 387 They merely copy
the prices which NYMEX generates. 388 Therefore, ICE is
certainly guilty of free riding on the efforts of NYMEX. This
seems to be the most glaring wrong committed by ICE.
As for the fourth prong, ICE's use of the information is
certainly "in direct competition with a product or service
offered by the plaintiff." In fact, ICE's contracts are almost
identical to that of NYMEX and both are linked to the exact
same commodity in the same discrete futures market
within the financial community. It is no secret389that ICE has
"grown into a direct competitor to NYMEX."
While open
outcry trading markets like NYMEX accounted for 95
percent of all futures trading in 1998, due to the rise of
electronic exchanges, by 2003, they accounted for "barely
more than half."3 90 In fact, it is speculated that "the role of
open outcry trading [will] continue its decline in coming
years as open outcry markets are challenged directly by allelectronic competitors." 391 Since both ICE and NYMEX
market the exact same products to the general population
of financial customers, it is clear the two are in direct
competition.
Finally, the last prong reverts back to the fundamental
principle of whether misappropriation enforcement is
necessary in order to preserve the "incentive to generate"
the product. The harm that this prong addresses is whether
ICE's use of the prices reduces NYMEX's incentive to
produce the product or service such that the existence or
quality of NYMEX's contracts would be substantially
threatened. The total revenue NYMEX received from
clearing and transaction fees for crude oil futures decreased

387. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 854 (2d Cir.
1997).
388. See Ali Sartipzadeh, ICE's CounterclaimsAgainst NYMEX Dismissed;
CFTC Should Decide Matter, 36 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1400 (Aug. 2, 2004)
(explaining that ICE's actions constitute as evidence of free-riding); see also
KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 5, at 100 (explaining that even in the late
nineteenth century, upon the development of the telegraph, the "rapid
transmission of up-to-the-minute quotations made it easier for off-exchange
traders to 'free-ride' off the exchange-generated quotations").
389. Garner, supra note 3, at 946.
390. KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 5, at 66.
391. Id.
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from 35.4% to 26.2% from 2004 to 2006.392 Likewise, the
clearing and transaction revenue for Henry Hub natural
gas futures decreased from 17.1% to 14.0% from 2004 to
2006. 393 A direct competitor's use of these prices and the
resulting loss of revenue to NYMEX certainly have an
impact on incentive to produce the product. 394 The contrary
argument, as addressed by the NYME court, is that
NYMEX has to produce the prices anyway in order to
operate as an exchange. However, ICE is a relatively new
entity, and electronic exchanges are largely taking the
business away from exchanges tied to the trading floor. 395
As noted in INS, "[t]he ability of [AP's] competitors to
appropriate their product at only nominal cost and thereby
to disseminate a competing product at a lower price would
destroy the incentive to collect news in the first place. '396
This largely turns on the basis of granting protection to a
private entity in order that it provides a service to the
public for an economic incentive. Therefore, potentially, if
all of the other exchanges took part in the same activity as
that of ICE, NYMEX could reach a point where it would no
longer have the incentives to generate these settlement
prices.
Moreover, the "quality of the contracts" are threatened
due to the present price manipulation that exists on
account of ICE using the exact same contracts as NYMEX
in an exchange with less regulation. Market manipulation
"impairs" the marketplace in that traders "flee markets in
which prices do not correspond to the true economic value of
the good being traded. ' 397 For example, it has been noted
392. See HOLDINGS, supra note 6, at 17.
393. Id.
394. See INDEXING FOR MAXIMUM INVESTMENT RESULTS, supra note 4, at 352
(illustrating the connection between incentive and competition by explaining
that "Dow Jones, which had sufficient incentive to produce the average before,
still has that incentive because there is no direct competition; there is,
therefore, nothing about the creation of this novel futures contract that
diminishes the gains that Dow Jones gets from producing its index").
395. KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 5, at 66 (explaining that "observers
expect the role of open outcry trading to continue its decline in coming years as
open outcry markets are challenged directly by all-electronic competitors").
396. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d. 841, 853 (2d Cir.
1997).
397. KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 5, at 78.
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that the "manipulation by Amaranth in the natural gas
markets, the alleged manipulation of propane markets by
BP, [and] the proven manipulations of Enron have led the
public to question the integrity of the derivatives
market. ' 398 Similarly, due to the current manipulation
between NYMEX and ICE, the quality of the contractsspecifically those of Henry Hub natural gas and West Texas
Intermediate crude oil-have certainly been threatened.
Based on the perpetually waning economic incentives
NYMEX has in generating these prices and the loss of
trader confidence in the market as a result of ICE's freeriding, there is certainly an argument here which could
have allowed for a misappropriation claim to be used to
keep the prices from ICE's grasp.
CONCLUSION

Given the legal landscape at the time this case was
brought, it was certainly plausible for NYMEX's counsel to
rely on CCC and CDN as authority for providing protection
to its settlement prices. However, based on the court's
judgment, it now appears as if NYMEX's counsel took
Second and Ninth Circuit precedent too far. Between the
court's characterization of the CCC authority for individual
prices as dictum, and claims from the U. S. Copyright Office
that protection should never be provided to a price-despite
any discussion of creation or discovery-it seems that
copyright protection for individual price values has reached
its end. Moreover, based on this decision's authority, it is
unlikely that a price will ever again be able to by-pass the
harsh ramifications of the merger doctrine in this circuit.
The Second Circuit has put its foot down on copyright
protection in prices and, given the U.S. Supreme Court's
denial of certiorari, it is only a matter of time until the
Ninth Circuit follows suit.
From a broader perspective, NYMEX's claim for
copyright protection in settlement prices for financial data
may have been doomed from the beginning. In endlessly
attempting to characterize the prices as creatures of works
of authorship, NYMEX's counsel may have overlooked the
more reasonable means of protecting the prices as time-

398.

HEARING, supra note 7,

at 8.
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sensitive material. The fundamental dilemma in NYMEX's
argument is that copyright provides protection for an
extended period of time. Consequently, granting copyright
for a financial value which becomes universally accessible
shortly after its creation could prove to be problematic. The
underlying issue most probably was not one of creation or
discovery-as the court leads us to believe-but rather,
whether it would have been plausible to grant copyright
protection for an exchange's prices prior to the period when
they slip into the public domain.
In addition, an unfair competition claim would have
respected the boundaries between that of the court's
authority and financial regulatory entities. Alleging that
ICE misappropriated the settlement prices would have
ensured that the values were kept out of the clutches of just
one exchange. On the other hand, copyright protection
would have given NYMEX the exclusive authority to
determine who may receive access to their prices for an
extended period of time-information which the court may
have implicitly felt the CFTC would be better off regulating.
For this reason, the court may have been more receptive to
NYMEX's claims if its counsel had fashioned arguments
aimed at the heart of the public interest. Were the court to
more closely consider the disparate regulatory measures of
the exchanges, the CFTC's lax attitude toward taking steps
in addressing the problems which derive from allowing
linked financial instruments to be traded on exempt
markets, and the turmoil suffered by consumers as energy
prices rapidly escalated nationwide, it may have been more
lenient in providing NYMEX with some form of protection
in its prices. Yet, in approaching this case as one of
litigation between two private parties, the court was blind
to the broader economic harms associated with granting
ICE access to these prices.
NYMEX had its day in court. While it is certain that
copyright law in the Second Circuit has changed, the harm
suffered by the economy as a result of ICE's use of
NYMEX's intellectual property has yet to be fully resolved.
Now it is up to the CFTC to pick up the slack.

